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3Preface 
While the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is generally viewed as 
an internal policy of the European Union, it also has a significant external 
dimension. Following several initiatives from the European Council, the EU 
has thus become a global player in areas such as migration policy, the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime. Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon intends 
to enhance the Union’s capacity to act on the international stage, and notably 
as regards the various aspects of the AFSJ.
Published in the context of the SIEPS research programme on The EU 
external action and the Treaty of Lisbon, the present report provides a timely 
assessment of the impact which the new Treaty is having on the external 
posture of the EU as regards its fast developing AFSJ.
Anna Stellinger 
Head of Agency
SIEPS carries out multidisciplinary research in current European  affairs. 
As an independent governmental agency, we connect academic analysis 
and policymaking at Swedish and European levels.
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7Executive summary
Although the European Union’s (EU) “area of freedom, security and justice” 
(AFSJ) is primarily an internal political project to provide citizens with an 
area without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is 
ensured, external action is of vital importance to its realisation. Many of the 
challenges the AFSJ is expected to respond to have a major – and in some 
cases, such as organised crime, terrorism and illegal immigration, even a 
primarily – international dimension.  Not meeting the international threats to 
the huge vulnerable open internal space which the AFSJ constitutes could put 
into question its very existence. 
This report considers first the reasons for the development of the AFSJ external 
dimension and the post-Lisbon legal and institutional frameworks before then 
analysing the major forms of EU action and assessing the implications of 
this external dimension for both the EU and the Member States and its future 
developments prospects.  
The emergence of the external dimension of the AFSJ has allowed the EU 
to complement internal action on AFSJ objectives with an increasingly wide 
range of forms of action: from strategy formulation over cooperation with 
third-countries, capacity-building and common action within international 
organisations. The use of the combined political weight of the EU, regrouping 
both the Member States and other EU external policies of relevance to third-
countries, has made it easier to secure cooperation of third-countries on a 
range of AFSJ relevant issues from readmission, over anti-money-laundering 
measures to the sharing of law enforcement data. 
Yet the benefits which the external AFSJ dimension is bringing to the EU do 
not stop with their contribution to achieving the AFSJ’s internal objectives. 
The rapid growth of this domain of EU external action since 1999 has added a 
substantial new dimension to the Union’s role in international relations beyond 
its already established actorness in fields like trade, development and foreign 
and security policy. There can be no doubt that in the aftermath of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks the fact that the EU could – via its new external competences 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam – become the agent of a collective 
international European response and be accepted as such by the United States 
has added to its international weight and visibility. The same can also be 
said, for instance, with regard to visa facilitation as third-countries have had 
8to accept that with the harmonisation of EU (Schengen) visa lists, the only 
way of obtaining visa concessions has become to engage negotiations with 
the EU as whole which, inter alia, normally means accepting readmission 
agreements in return.
The Treaty of Lisbon has strengthened the EU’s potential to further develop 
the external dimension of the AFSJ through the abolition of the ‘pillar 
structure’, the creation of a single legal personality, a unified procedure for the 
negotiation and conclusion of agreements, the extension of qualified majority 
voting and some extension of EU internal competence on AFSJ matters 
which – if used – could extend external action possibilities. The 2009 to 2014 
Stockholm Programme also places a greater emphasis on this dimension 
of the AFSJ than any of its predecessors. This, as well as the fact that the 
external challenges to the AFSJ continue to figure prominently in EU threat 
assessments, should contribute to a growing expansion of the AFSJ external 
dimension until the end of the current programming period, and beyond. 
Such an expansion will not come without funding implications, especially 
in view of the EU’s interest in law enforcement and migration management 
capacity building in (mostly neighbouring) third countries. The negotiations 
on the upcoming new Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 provide 
an opportunity to establish an adequate financial framework for the growth 
potential of the AFSJ external dimension.
Yet a number of factors will continue to impact negatively on the development 
potential of the external side of the AFSJ: The diversity of the fields covered 
– from asylum and immigration over civil and criminal justice to police 
cooperation – limits the potential for the external AFSJ dimension to develop 
into a single ‘policy’. The resulting relative fragmentation makes it more 
difficult for AFSJ external objectives to be given the same political weight 
as that of other more established and homogenous external EU policies (such 
as the CFSP, trade, development). This in turn contributes to the difficulties 
of its effective integration with other external EU policies, which is also 
hampered by different strings of decision-making and the complex post-
Lisbon institutional structure. If one adds to this the continuing limitations 
of the EU’s only ‘shared’ competences, it seems clear that ultimately further 
progress will continue to depend heavily on the Member States’ realisation of 
their common interests in this domain of vital interests to their citizens – and 
to agree on common external action accordingly. 
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1 Introduction
The European Union’s “area of freedom, security and justice” (AFSJ) has 
developed into a much more dynamic and substantial European policy-
making domain than its modest origins might have suggested. What was still 
referred to as mere “cooperation” in the fields of justice and home affairs 
(JHA) at the time of the Maastricht Treaty has turned into a major political 
project of the EU which the Treaty of Lisbon has placed even before the 
Internal Market and Economic and Monetary Union in the list of fundamental 
treaty objectives of Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). More 
than 1400 texts dealing with AFSJ matters adopted by the JHA Council1 
since the extensive Treaty of Amsterdam reforms of 1999 and the creation 
of a range of special offices and agencies (starting with the formation of the 
Europol Drugs Unit in 1994) testify to the enormous growth of this policy-
making domain.
The main rationale of the AFSJ as a political project is clearly an internal one. 
Article 3(2) TEU expresses this in clear terms by providing that the Union 
“shall offer to its citizens” an AFSJ “without internal frontiers, in which 
the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration 
and the prevention and combating of crime”. While the objective is to offer 
citizens the fundamental public goods of “freedom, security and justice” 
in an internal area, this objective can never be achieved by purely internal 
EU measures because of the essentially transnational nature of the primary 
challenges of asylum, migration and crime on which the Treaty provides for 
“appropriate measures” of the EU. These cross not only borders inside the 
EU but also – and this is the often the bigger challenge – the EU’s external 
borders, so that external action in relations with third-countries is not an 
option but a necessity.
The development of an external dimension can thus be regarded as intrinsically 
linked to the project of an internal AFSJ. Starting with the Tampere European 
Council of October 1999, all EU five-year programmes for the development 
of the AFSJ have therefore provided for external action to help achieve the 
AFSJ internal objectives. In the latest of these programmes, the 2010–2014 
1 Figure based on annual lists of JHA Council texts provided by Directorate-General H of the 
EU Council Secretariat.
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Stockholm Programme, an entire section is dedicated to the “external 
dimension” of the AFSJ on top of a whole range of external measures provided 
for in the individual policy fields.2 Unsurprisingly this external dimension has 
been growing with the rapid extension of internal action since the Amsterdam 
Treaty reforms, and by 2011 26 out of a total of 136 texts adopted by the 
JHA Council, i.e., 19.1%, dealt primarily with the conclusion of agreements 
with third-countries and other external dimension issues with.3 As a result the 
EU has also increasingly emerged as an international actor in its own right 
on AFSJ matters and has been recognised as such by third-countries. This 
is demonstrated, for instance, by the obvious interest of the US in counter-
terrorism cooperation with the EU since the 9/11 attacks. 
As the external dimension has been of such growing importance for the 
Union’s AFSJ, and as it has clearly also added a new dimension to previously 
existing fields of EU external relations, an assessment of the progress the EU 
has made in developing this dimension, its further potential and its limitations 
seems very appropriate at a moment when EU external action possibilities 
have again been strengthened by the reforms of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. That 
assessment is the objective of this report: It will first consider the reasons 
for the development of the external dimension of the AFSJ and the post-
Lisbon legal and institutional frameworks, then analyse the progress and 
limitations of major forms of EU action and assess – in the concluding part 
– the implications of this external dimension for both the EU and the Member 
States and the prospects for its future development. 
As a caveat it should be noted that this analysis will focus on the external 
dimension of the AFSJ as it is defined by the substantive provisions of Title V 
of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. There 
will therefore be no more than passing reference to external JHA measures 
which are part of CFSP peace-keeping operations. 
2 European Council: The Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010, pp. 33-37.
3 Own calculations based on annual lists of JHA Council texts (see note 1).
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2  The reasons for the development of the AFSJ 
external dimension
2.1 The instrumental nature of the AFSJ external dimension
The development of EU JHA cooperation – which eventually led to the 
introduction of the AFSJ as a fundamental treaty objective – was historically 
driven to a considerable extent by the need to develop compensatory measures 
for the partial – in the case of the Internal Market – and even total – in the 
case of the Schengen countries – dismantling of internal border controls. In 
order to avoid the resulting liberalisation of cross-border movements having 
negative repercussions for the fight against crime, migration management 
and asylum issues, the Member States felt the need to adopt a wide range 
of common “compensatory” measures in the respective JHA fields.4 This 
rationale of “compensatory” JHA action being needed as a result of the 
dismantling of internal borders is also part of the core of the AFSJ project 
which, as mentioned above, is defined in Article 3(2) TEU in the first place 
as an area “without internal frontiers” requiring “appropriate” JHA measures 
for the fulfilment of the objective of free movement of persons. 
The external dimension of the AFSJ is part of the range of these 
“compensatory” measures “appropriate” for establishing and maintaining 
the AFSJ, and as such it is an instrument of its internal construction. This 
was put it clear terms in the 2005 EU “Strategy for the External Dimension 
of JHA” which described the AFSJ as “the starting point” for engaging 
with third-countries on JHA issues and that the building of the AFSJ has 
generated “a need to ensure a commensurate priority is given to JHA issues 
in the EU’s external action”.5 The AFSJ external dimension therefore appears 
as a necessary external instrument and complement to the internal efforts to 
construct an AFSJ without internal borders. This provides both a powerful 
political rationale for its development – as the external side of a major internal 
political project – and a political limitation – as it cannot be considered as 
an external policy in its own right, like the Common Commercial Policy or 
4 On the emergence and growth of the rationale of JHA “compensatory” measures in the 
1980s and 1990s, see Wenceslas de Lobkowicz: L’Europe et la sécurité intérieure, Paris: La 
documentation française 2002, pp. 25-61.  
5 Council of the European Union: A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global 
Freedom, Security and Justice, Council document 15446/05 of 6.12.2005, pp. 5 and 8. 
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the CFSP, but only as an instrumental ancillary dimension of the essentially 
internal political project of the AFSJ.
2.2 Responding to external JHA challenges
The attainment of fundamental internal AFSJ objectives depends to a 
considerable extent on the capacity of the EU to master external challenges 
to these objectives. This applies, in particular, to the objective of ensuring “a 
high level of security” within the AFSJ provided for by Article 67(3) TFEU. 
The most recent Europol reports have, again, highlighted the extent of these 
challenges. 
While there is a wide range of organised crime groups of EU origin, organised 
crime from outside the EU contributes very significantly to security threats 
within the EU. According the 2011 Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(OCTA) Report of Europol: West African, Albanian and Lithuanian groups 
have acquired a new prominence in the trafficking of drugs into the EU; 
Chinese, Vietnamese, Pakistani, and again West African groups in the source-
to-destination trafficking of illegal immigrants; and Chinese and Nigerian 
groups in the trafficking of human beings. Over recent years a new “Balkan 
axis” for trafficking to the EU has emerged, through which Albanian, Turkish 
and Former Soviet Union criminal groups “are seeking to expand their 
interests in the EU, and may exploit opportunities in the possible accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen Zone, and recent and prospective 
EU visa exemptions for Western Balkan states, the Ukraine and Moldova”.6 
In other major organised crime fields too, such as fraud, Euro and commodity 
counterfeiting, weapons trafficking and environmental crime, the involvement 
of non-EU crime groups was reported to be extensive.
As regards terrorist threats, the initial focus in the EU on the global threat 
posed by Islamist terrorists after the 9/11 attacks has given way to a more 
differentiated threat assessment which gives due weight to the extensive 
terrorist activities of “home-grown” origin. This especially concerns 
separatist terrorist attacks which, according to Europol’s 2011 Terrorism 
Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), accounted for 160 out of 249 terrorist 
6 Europol: EU Organised Crime Assessment. OCTA 2011, The Hague: Europol 2011, pp. 6-7, 
16 and 18.
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incidents during 2010.7 Nevertheless the threat posed by Islamist terrorist 
networks based outside of the EU remains important, with one-third of all 
arrested suspects in 2010 having been born in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia. Much of the terrorist propaganda and incitement sources originate 
from outside of the EU, and training is provided for EU-born “jihadists” in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.8 Some third-country separatist 
terrorist groups, like the Kurdish PKK and the “Tamil Tigers”, are also 
carrying out extortion operations as well as drug-trafficking and trafficking 
in human beings in the EU.9
With the EU being one of the most privileged regions in the world in terms 
of peace, stability and prosperity, it has been a destination of choice for large 
numbers of third-country nationals seeking to make a living somewhere 
within the EU or simply wanting to escape from the misery in their home 
countries. The challenge this poses to the management of migration flows 
from third-countries into the EU is reflected in the fact that the EU’s external 
border management agency Frontex reported in its annual Risk Analysis for 
2011 that there were 108,500 refusals of entry, 104,049 detections of illegal 
crossings at EU external borders and 348,666 cases of illegal stay of third-
country nationals within the EU during 2010.10 While most of the third-
country nationals in question have no connection with criminal activities, 
some of them do – organised crime is heavily involved in the lucrative 
facilitation of illegal entry and the trafficking of human beings. As a result 
most Member States, apart from having to deal with illegal migration as a 
difficult issue in their domestic politics, also regard it as a security issue.
Last but not least the EU is also a major destination for refugees from third-
countries seeking political asylum or temporary protection from war or 
violent strife affecting their home countries. During 2010 the EU Member 
States received in total 235,930 asylum applications, three times more than 
the next most important asylum destination in the developed world, Canada 
7  Europol: EU TE-STAT 2011. Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, The Hague: Europol 
2011, p. 26.
8  Ibid., pp. 17-20.
9  Ibid., pp. 22-23.
10  Frontex: Annual Risk Analysis 2011, Warsaw: Frontex 2011, p. 13. 
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and the US (78,690).11 While asylum policy clearly lies outside of the 
security mandate of the AFSJ it is enough of a concern for Member States 
faced with lengthy and costly asylum procedures involving large numbers of 
applications which turn out to be unfounded, and the ensuing difficulties of 
returning rejected applicants to third-country of origin or transit. 
All these external challenges for the AFSJ have in common that the EU’s 
capacity to respond effectively to them depends crucially on cooperation with 
third-countries. 
The EU’s external borders can reduce but not stop crime and terrorism 
challenges threatening the EU from the outside, and once they are inside “the 
beast is loose” in an area of largely dismantled borders.12 As a result purely 
national responses would be as ineffective as purely internal EU measures. 
Crime and terrorism challenges can only be effectively tackled if the countries 
from which they originate or through which they transit agree with the EU on 
the need to tackle them effectively on their own territories, if they cooperate 
with the EU as regards law enforcement intelligence sharing, and if the 
EU can help them – where needed – to build up their law enforcement and 
judicial capabilities. It is also only through their common collective weight 
that the Member States can hope to put sufficient pressure on third-countries 
to cooperate and to have the maximum chance to achieve the best possible 
negotiation outcomes in international fora like the UN. More than just being 
an added value, the AFSJ external dimension is therefore a necessity in the 
fight against crime and terrorism.
The same applies to migration and asylum policy challenges. The numbers 
of migrants entering the EU illegally can be reduced if countries of origin or 
transit cooperate with the EU by better controlling their borders, building-
up border management capabilities and sharing relevant intelligence about 
migration routes, traffickers and facilitators. Perhaps even more importantly, 
11  UNHCR: Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, Geneva: UNHCR 2011, p. 
15.
12  Jörg Monar and Hans Nilsson: Enhancing the EU’s effectiveness in response to international 
criminality and terrorism: current deficits and elements of a realist post-2009 agenda, in: 
Olaf Cramme (ed.): Rescuing the European Project: EU legitimacy, governance and security, 
London: Policy Network 2009, p. 119.
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the cooperation of third-countries is a conditio sine qua non for EU Member 
States to be able to return identified illegal immigrants or rejected asylum 
seekers to countries of origin or transit. Without its external dimension, EU 
asylum and migration policy as part of the AFSJ would face the prospect 
of both higher pressures on its (porous) borders and fewer possibilities to 
send third-country nationals in an irregular situation back, which could add 
significantly to the domestic political problems many Member States are 
experiencing in this policy field.
In the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters the EU does not face 
external pressures of similarly political sensitivity as those impacting on 
internal security and migration management, yet there are forceful reasons 
for common external action as well. The interests of both EU citizens and 
companies can be affected very negatively by the absence of legal certainty 
and foreseeability in civil and commercial matters involving legal systems 
outside of the EU. These can only be provided by international agreements, 
and the EU also has to protect the uniform application in international 
negotiations which might affect it.13  
2.3 Internal growth of the AFSJ
In addition to the external dimension being part of “compensatory” and 
“appropriate” measures rationale of the construction of the AFSJ and to 
the need to respond to major external challenges, the development of this 
additional dimension has also been driven forward by the massive internal 
growth of the AFSJ. The extension of EU internal action possibilities through 
the Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam (1999) and Lisbon (2009) treaty reforms, 
the growth of the internal legal acquis and the establishment and successive 
strengthening of the special agencies Europol, Eurojust and Frontex have all 
contributed to a parallel growth of the rationale, possibilities and needs of EU 
external action. 
An obvious example for the dependency of external AFSJ action on internal 
progress is that of the visa facilitation agreements with third-countries of 
which the EU has been negotiating and concluding an increasing number, 
13  Council of the European Union: External relations strategy in the field of judicial cooperation 
in civil matters, Council document 6571/1/08 REV 1 of 7.5.2008, p. 2.
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starting with Hong Kong in 2001/2002. It only became possible for the EU 
to engage in negotiations with third-countries on visa facilitation after the 
EU14 had completed its common visa policy with the adoption of Council 
Regulation (EC) 574/199915 determining the third-countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the 
Member States. This possibility became at the same time also the only way 
for EU (Schengen) Member States to grant visa facilitation arrangements to 
third-country nationals. 
The same dependency of the external dimension on internal developments 
can also be observed with regard to the institutional capabilities of the EU. An 
example is the posting of third-country liaison magistrates to the EU, which 
only became possible after the establishment in 2002 of the EU cross-border 
prosecution unit Eurojust to which currently three third-country prosecutors 
are posted.16
The internal development of the AFSJ has also made the EU an increasingly 
important partner for third-countries seeking to reinforce cooperation on 
specific JHA issues, forcing the EU in turn to meet that demand. An example 
of the development of the AFSJ external dimension in response to external 
demand is the rapid and significant expansion of EU-US counter-terrorism 
cooperation following to the transmission of a long list of requests from US 
President George W. Bush to Commission President Romano Prodi on 16 
October 2001 in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.17 Although many of 
the requests were not accepted by the EU, counter-terrorism cooperation 
with the US subsequently broke new ground for the external dimension of 
the AFSJ. This is reflected in the holding of regular cooperation meetings at 
different levels, the negotiation of two Europol agreements on the sharing 
of data in 2001 and 2002 and of two agreements on extradition and mutual 
legal assistance in 2003, coordination work on terrorist lists, the posting of 
14  Consisting of the countries of the Schengen group only as Ireland and the UK are not 
participating in the common visa policy.
15  Subsequently replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001, OJ L 
81 of 21.3.2001.
16 From the US, Canada and Croatia. Europol fact sheet on liaison magistrates: http://www.
eurojust.europa.eu/ coll_lmp.htm
17 Text of the letter: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/nov/06Ausalet.htm (last visited on 
30 April 2012).
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liaison officers in Washington and FBI liaison officers in The Hague, and 
eventually the conclusion of the (highly controversial) EU-US agreement on 
the collection, transfer and storing of Passenger Name Records (PNR).18
18 See Kristin Archick: US-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, Washington: Congressional 
Research Service 2005, pp. 2-4. The 2004 PNR agreement was invalidated by the EU Court 
of Justice in 2006 on the grounds of absence of an appropriate legal basis, but it was replaced 
by a largely similar interim agreement in October 2006. That in turn was replaced in 2007 
by a new agreement which is still only provisionally in force as it was not ratified by the 
European Parliament because of concerns about inadequate data protection safeguards. A 
revised agreement was signed on 14 December 2011 but currently (March 2012) it is still in 
need of ratification by the Parliament. 
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3  The post-Lisbon legal framework of the AFSJ 
external dimension
3.1 The changed position of the AFSJ in the treaty architecture
In view of the “pillar” architecture of the TEU prior to the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the AFSJ was split between four 
policy areas based on Title IV TEC (asylum, migration, border controls and 
judicial cooperation in civil matters) and two which were based on Title VI 
TEU (judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation). This 
not only had the consequence that different legal instruments and different 
procedures had to be used for the adoption of internal measures but also that 
external relations were governed by substantially different rules depending on 
whether “first pillar” (Title IV TEC) or “third pillar” (Title VI TEU) matters 
were concerned. In the first case agreements were negotiated and concluded 
as European Community agreements on the basis of shared or exclusive EC 
competences – depending on the nature of EC internal competences on the 
respective subject-matter –, with the Commission as chief negotiator and 
the Council deciding after consultation of the European Parliament on the 
conclusion by either qualified majority voting (QMV) or unanimity, depending 
on the voting rules applicable to the adoption of internal rules on the subject-
matter. In the second case the negotiation and conclusion of agreements was 
subject to former Article 24 TEU (dealing with CFSP agreements), providing 
for the Council Presidency to negotiate and the Council by unanimity to 
conclude the respective agreements.19 These agreements were concluded as 
agreements of the EU (rather than the Member States) with the third-countries 
concerned20 although the TEU did not explicitly confer upon the Union either 
an international legal personality or a shared or exclusive competence. The 
peculiar nature of “third pillar” international agreements was reinforced by 
the fact that most Member States insisted on those agreements being – often 
rather lengthily – ratified in line with national constitutional rules by their 
19 See Jörg Monar: The EU as an International Actor in the Domain of Justice and Home 
Affairs, in: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9, no. 3, 2004, pp. 396-403, and Steve 
Peers: EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006 (second 
edition), pp. 81-85.
20 An example are the aforementioned 2003 agreements with the USA on extradition and 
mutual legal assistance which were negotiated in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
(OJ L 181 of 19.7.2003, p. 27 and 34).
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parliaments,21 which further distinguished these agreements from AFSJ “first 
pillar” agreements. 
Internationally the pre-Lisbon “first/third pillar” divide made the EU appear 
as an actor that was split in legal terms. This not only added to the complexity 
of internal procedures regarding the negotiation and conclusion of AFSJ 
international agreements but also allowed third-countries in certain cases to 
question – for tactical reasons – the legal capacity of the EU to enter into 
binding agreements on “third pillar” matters because of the absence of an 
explicit legal personality and competence of the Union as such.22
The Treaty of Lisbon reforms have put an end to the “pillar divide” in the 
external dimension of the AFSJ by merging the formerly legally separated 
fields into Title V of the Third Part of the TFEU. The negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements with third-countries on AFSJ matters has now 
achieved a single and clearer framework through the establishment of a single 
EU legal personality (Article 47 TEU) and a single treaty-making procedure 
(Article 218 TFEU). Although different decision-making rules still apply 
depending on the subject-matter (see below) the EU can now as a result of 
the changed position of the AFSJ in the treaty architecture act internationally 
with greater legal coherence and a reduced potential for confusion or even a 
questioning of the Union’s legal capacity on the part of third-countries.
3.2 Competences
In line with the principle of conferral the EU can “act only within the limits 
of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties” 
(Article 5(2) TFEU). The EU Treaties do not provide for an express general 
competence of the EU to act on external AFSJ matters, let alone an AFSJ 
external dimension as such. The only explicit references made to external 
action are to be found in Article 78(2)(g) TFEU, with regard to partnership 
and cooperation with third-countries for the purpose of managing inflows 
21  The need for national parliamentary ratification led to considerable delays of the entry into 
force, more than six years in the case of the two 2003 agreements with the US which the 
Council was only able to conclude in October 2009 (Council Decision 2009/820/CFSP of 
23.10.2009 , OJ L 291 of 7.11.2009, p.40).
22 See, on the pre-Lisbon problems in this respect, Philippe de Schoutheete and Sami Andoura: 
The Legal Personality of the European Union, Brussels: Royal Institute for International 
Affairs 2007, pp. 233-235 and 241-243.
22
of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection, and 
Article 79(3) TFEU, with regard to the conclusion of readmission agreements 
with third-countries. These two explicit legal bases for external action have 
been newly introduced by the Lisbon Treaty but are in fact only a codification 
of existing practices as the EU – acting as the EC as these were former “first 
pillar” matters – had already been active on both accounts.23 
However, the fact that explicit EU powers under the TFEU are currently 
limited to the sole cases of Articles 78(2)(g) and 79(3) does not constitute an 
impediment against external action on a wide range of AFSJ issues:
Already before the Lisbon Treaty the European Court of Justice had 
established, through major case-law going back to the early 1970s, that the EC 
had legal capacity to enter into international commitments within the whole 
field of objectives defined in the Treaty, with such competence either being 
explicitly stated in the Treaty or resulting implicitly from the provisions of 
the Treaty.24 The Court had made the existence of “implied” (i.e. non-explicit) 
external powers dependent on three conditions: First the existence of treaty 
objectives for whose achievement the external action is to be undertaken,25 
second the existence of explicit internal powers on the matter on which 
external action is to be undertaken,26 and third the existence of a necessity to 
23 In case of the readmission agreements, the Council issued the first negotiation mandates 
to the Commission – for agreements with Morocco, Pakistan and Russia – as early as 
September 2000.
24 Case 22/70 (AETR/ERTA) Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263, Joined cases 3, 4 and 
6/76 Kramer, Cornelius and others [1976] ECR 1279 and Opinion 2/91 (Re: ILO Convention) 
[1973] ECR I-1061. – The principle of implied powers was forcefully reconfirmed by the 
Court in its 2006 Opinion on the Lugano Convention: Opinion 1/2003 on the Lugano 
Convention, [2006] ECR I-1145.  
25 Case 22/70 (AETR/ERTA) Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263; Joined cases 3,4 and 
6/76 Kramer, Cornelius and others [1976] ECR 1279; Opinion 1/94 (Re: Competence of the 
Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of 
intellectual property rights) [1994] ECR I-5267. 
26 Opinion 1/76 (Re: Draft Agreement for a Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels) 
[1977] ECR 741; Opinion 2/94 (Re: Accession of the Community to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) [1996] ECR 
I-1759.
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act externally for the achievement of the respective treaty objectives.27 Before 
Lisbon, all external AFSJ action in the context of the (EC) “first pillar” could 
be based on these so-called “implied external powers” in conjunction with the 
respective AFSJ objectives provided for by the EC Treaty. Yet such implied 
external competences could not be invoked for external action in the context 
of the “third pillar” where the interpretation of the extent of EU external 
competences was largely left to the intergovernmental consensus amongst 
the Member States. 
The Lisbon Treaty reforms have for the first time codified the “implied 
external powers” jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in revised Article 216(1) 
TFEU which provides that the Union may conclude an agreement with third-
countries or international organisations “where the Treaties so provide or 
where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within 
the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in 
the Treaties”. As the former “third pillar” fields have been merged with the 
former “first pillar” fields within the TFEU this means that now the entire 
AFSJ external dimension is governed by the principle of implied external 
powers. This means that, apart from the field specific forms of external action 
provided for by Articles 78(2)(g) and 79(3) TFEU, the EU can act externally 
only on an AFSJ subject-matter if there is a treaty based internal objective and 
if external action is necessary to achieve that objective.28 One can therefore 
conclude that, in terms of its potential for legal action, the external dimension 
of the AFSJ is similarly dependent on and limited by AFSL internal objectives, 
as it is politically dependent on the essentially internal nature of the AFSJ as 
an EU political project (see above, sub-section 2.1). 
27 Opinion 1/76 (Re: Draft Agreement for a Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels) 
[1977] ECR 741; Opinion 1/94 (Re: Competence of the Community to conclude international 
agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property rights) [1994] 
ECR I-5267; Cases C-467/98 Commission v Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519; C-468/98 
Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I-9575; C-469/98 Commission v Finland [2002] ECR 
I-9627; C-471//98 Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I-9681; C-472/98 Commission v 
Luxembourg [2002] ECR I-9741; C-475/98 Commission v Austria [2002] I-9797; C-476/98 
Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9855.
28 For a more detailed analysis of post-Lisbon EU implied external powers in the context of the 
AFSJ, see Marise Cremona: EU External Action in the JHA Domain. A Legal Perspective, 
in: Marise Cremona, Jörg Monar and Sara Poli (eds.): The External Dimension of the 
European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 2011, 
pp. 82-87, and Piet Eeckhout: EU External Relations Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2011 (second edition), pp. 157-163. 
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There are further limitations on the competence side which need to be 
considered. One results from the nature of EU competences in the context 
of the AFSJ. According to Article 4(2)(j) TFEU, the AFSJ is a domain of 
“shared competence” between the Union and the Member States. This 
means that Member States can continue to exercise their competence on 
AFSJ matters to the extent the Union has not exercised its competence 
(Article 2(2) TFEU). There are so far very few AFSJ matters on which the 
EU has exercised its competences to the extent of full harmonisation so 
that as a result it enjoys exclusive powers on related external action. One of 
those is the full harmonisation of visa lists which, as a result, gives the EU 
exclusive powers for the conclusions of visa waiver agreements.29 On most 
AFSJ matters, however, such full harmonisation has not taken place, so that 
the Member States retain at least partial competence and hence the right to 
participate in any international agreement together with the EU. Such “mixed 
agreements” being more complicated to negotiate and needing ratification by 
all national parliaments, Member States have so far not insisted on their right 
to join AFSJ related external agreements as contracting parties, except in the 
case of major multilateral legal instruments such as the 2000 UN Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention) and the 2003 
UN Convention against Corruption.30 
Nevertheless, in the absence of EU exclusive competences Member States 
can – and indeed do – continue to conclude international agreements on 
AFSJ related subject matters (see below section 5.2). They have even 
explicitly reserved for themselves the right to continue to negotiate and 
conclude agreements on matters relating to the crossing of external borders,31 
and a Declaration attached to the Lisbon Treaty Final Act32 does the same 
for agreements in the fields of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
29 See Steve Peers: EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011 
(third edition), p. 128.
30 In the case of the 2007 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (which replaced the 1988 Lugano Convention), 
the ECJ ruled against “mixity” in favour of exclusive Community competence. Opinion 
1/03 (Lugano Convention) [2006] ECR I 1145.
31 Protocol 23 to the TEU and the TFEU on “external relations of the Member States with 
regard to the crossing of external borders” (OJ C 83 of 30.3.2010).
32 Declaration 36 on Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
concerning the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements by Member States 
relating to the area of freedom, security and justice (OJ C 83 of 30.3.2010).
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matters as well as police cooperation. As in all of these cases the conclusion 
of such agreements is subject to their compatibility with EU law, however, 
this can be regarded just as a further reaffirmation of the principle of shared 
competences.33
The Union’s possibilities to act are also restricted by the principle of 
subsidiarity of Article 5(3) TEU according to which
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall 
act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional 
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level.
Taken together the principles of shared competence and subsidiarity therefore 
mean that the EU can only act on an AFSJ matter – be it an internal or an 
external one – if it has been shown that the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be achieved by the Member States themselves and that as long as 
this has not been shown and the EU has not been able to act Member States 
remain free to act on the matter at their own level. Far from being a theoretical 
issue the Member States have repeatedly underlined this restriction on the 
expansion of EU action. A recent example has been the insistence of the 
JHA Council in its Conclusions on the Commission communication on “The 
European Union internal security strategy in action”, which fully recognised 
the need for a better linking of the internal and external aspects of EU internal 
security, on a prior demonstration of “the added value of action at Union 
level”.34 
Finally it also needs to be mentioned that according to Article 4(2) TEU – 
33 As a result these reservations can hardly be interpreted as a further restriction of EU 
competences. The same conclusion is reached in Ramses A. Wessel, Luisa Marin and 
Claudio Matera: The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
in: Christina Eckes and Theodore Konstadinides (eds.): Crime within the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. A European Public Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2011, p. 297.
34 Council of the European Union: Draft Council conclusions on the Commission 
communication on the European Union internal security strategy in action, Council 
document 6699/11 of 21.02.2011, pp. 4-5 (approved by the Council in its session of 24/25 
February 2011).
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newly introduced by the Lisbon Treaty – the Union is obliged to respect the 
Member States’ “essential state functions” which include “maintaining law 
and order and safeguarding national security”, with national security “in 
particular” remaining “the sole responsibility of each Member State”. This 
clearly limits the scope of the EU’s aforementioned internal security mandate 
of Article 67(3) TFEU in terms of both internal and external action. 
While consolidating and simplifying the EU’s external action possibilities 
through the abolition of the “pillar divide”, the Treaty of Lisbon has thus also 
confirmed and partially even extended previously existing general restrictions 
of EU external competences in the AFSJ domain. This has to be set against 
certain extensions of the EU’s internal AFSJ competences which can – if the 
aforementioned conditions are met – also expand its external action potential. 
The most relevant of those are:
1 The codification in the TFEU of the already existing political objective 
of introducing an integrated external border management system (Article 
77(1)(c) TFEU) could also provide a basis for new forms of border 
management cooperation with third-countries.
2 The introduction of the – already programmed – uniform asylum and 
subsidiary protection status (Article 78(2)(a) and (b) TFEU) could provide 
a better basis for the partnership and cooperation with third-countries 
for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or 
subsidiary or temporary protection provided for by Article 78(2)(g) TFEU. 
3 The introduction of a formal principle of “solidarity” including its 
“financial implications” for the fields of asylum and migration policy as 
well as external border management (Articles 67(2) and 80 TFEU) offers 
enhanced possibilities for the use of the EU budget for capacity building 
measures in favour of cooperating third-countries. 
4 The enhanced action potential on common rules regarding criminal 
procedure (Article 82(2) TFEU) and seven “new” fields of approximation 
of substantive criminal law – and potential extension to other fields 
(Article 83(1) and (2) TFEU) could, via its strengthening of the internal EU 
acquis, provide a stronger common platform for mutual legal assistance 
agreements with third-countries and the defence of common positions in 
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the criminal justice domain in relevant international organisations like the 
UN and the Council of Europe.
5 The potential establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(Article 86 TFEU) could offer new possibilities of cooperation with the 
prosecution services of third-countries.
In each case, however, the use of a potential new legal competence will 
depend on the Member States willingness to exploit it and their perception 
of its potential to provide substantial “added value” to existing EU or purely 
national measures.
3.3 Relationship with other EU external policies
As already indicated the Treaties do not provide for an external dimension of 
the AFSJ as such, let alone a self-standing “policy” in this domain. Yet EU 
external action on AFSJ matters is clearly part of overall EU external relations 
and is as such governed by the objectives of the Union’s “relations with the 
wider world” defined in Article 4(5) TEU. Several of those objectives have 
an obvious link with the objectives of the AFSJ. This applies, in particular, 
to: “the protection of its citizens” which corresponds to the AFSJ security 
mandate of Article 67(3) TFEU; the contribution to “security” in the world 
which, given the international nature of crime and terrorism challenges, 
clearly covers external AFSJ action as well; and the contribution “to the strict 
observance and the development of international law, including respect for 
the principles of the United Nations Charter”, a formulation wide enough 
to cover law enforcement and judicial cooperation as well as – through the 
reference to the UN framework – asylum policy issues. The external dimension 
of the AFSJ also serves several of the “principles” by which, according to 
Article 21 TEU, “the Union’s external action should be guided”. These are: 
the advancement of “the rule of law” and the “respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter and international law” (Article 21(1) TEU), and the 
objectives “to safeguard [...] its security” and to “consolidate and support [...] 
the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law” (Article 
21(2)(a)-(b) TEU. According to Article 21(3), these principles and objectives 
apply not only to the CFSP but also to the “external aspects” of the Union’s 
“other policies”.
The external AFSJ dimension, although not a self-standing EU external 
policy, has thus to be regarded as an integral part of EU external relations 
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overall governed by the principles and objectives of Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU. 
This raises the question of the coherence between external action on AFSJ 
matters and other EU external policies. This question is addressed by Article 
21(3) TEU, second paragraph, which provides for the Union to “ensure 
consistency between the different areas of its external action and between 
these and its other policies”, a double consistency obligation, applying 
both to different domains of external action and between each of those and 
internal policies. Council, Commission and the High Representative and 
Vice-President of the Commission (HRVP) are given a special responsibility 
to ensure that consistency (see below). Consistency between the Union’s 
“policies and activities” is also established as a general principle by Article 
7 TFEU. It is important to mention in this context that the Treaties do not 
establish any hierarchy between external policies. In view of the prominent 
position given to the CFSP through the long range of “specific provisions” in 
the TEU, the CFSP might easily appear to be in the position of a “lead” policy 
whose objectives enjoy priority over other fields of external EU action when it 
comes to ensuring “consistency”. Yet the Treaties do not make any provision 
for other fields of EU external action needing to be consistent “with” the 
CFSP, so that, at least formally, the external AFSJ dimension finds itself on 
an equal footing with the CFSP, and indeed other EU external policies, with 
regard to the requirement of consistency. This provides a legal justification for 
the tendency of both the JHA Council and the Commission to treat external 
AFSJ issues as a substantially autonomous external domain with regard to 
the CFSP.
It should be noted that there is a potential for overlap between the CFSP – with 
its general external security mandate – and the external dimension of the AFSJ 
because of the aforementioned international context of most of the serious 
cross-border crime issues falling within the AFSJ internal security mandate 
of Article 67(3) TFEU. This is particularly the case in the field of counter-
terrorism which has traditionally also been a CFSP priority. This overlap can 
give rise to questions and even tensions between institutions regarding the 
boundaries between external AFSJ and CFSP measures, as was been shown 
by the action of annulment which the European Parliament brought on 11 
March 2010 against EU Council Regulation 1286/2009 imposing financial 
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restrictions for counter-terrorism purposes35 on the grounds that the Council 
had adopted this Regulation on the basis of (CFSP) Article 215(2) TFEU 
instead of (AFSJ) Article 75 TFEU.36 Article 75 TFEU in fact provides an 
explicit legal base for the adoption of administrative measures aimed at 
freezing terrorist assets but the Council had preferred – no doubt primarily in 
order to avoid co-decision by the European Parliament under the “ordinary 
legislative procedure” (see section 3.4 below) – to use the much wider legal 
basis provided by Article 215(2) TFEU for imposing economic and financial 
sanctions in the CFSP context – which provides only for the information 
of the Parliament. This case is currently still pending before the ECJ, but 
the Opinion delivered by Advocate General Yves Bot on 31 January 2012 
has shown all the difficulties of drawing precise borderlines between the 
respective AFSJ and CFSP domains: The Advocate General endorsed, on the 
one hand, the Council’s choice of legal basis on the grounds of its overarching 
CFSP objectives of preserving peace and strengthening international security. 
On the other hand, he rejected the Council’s view that the delimitation of 
the respective spheres of application of Articles 75 TFEU and 215(2) TFEU 
should be based on a distinction between “internal” terrorists, “external” 
terrorists and “international” terrorists as being contrary to the very nature 
of terrorism “which, by attacking common values and the very foundations 
of the rule of law, affects the entire international community, irrespective of 
the geographical scale of the threat”.37 While the element of inter-institutional 
power struggle in this case is perfectly obvious, the AFSJ/CFSP boundary 
issue raises the wider question to what extent international counterterrorism 
measures should be guided more by a foreign policy or more by an internal 
security rationale. As both rationales are far from incompatible the obvious 
answer should be to combine and integrated both rationales. Such an 
35 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1286/2009 of 22 December 2009 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons 
and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban; OJ L 
346 of 23.12.2009.
36 Case C-130/10, European Parliament v Council of the European Union; OJ 134 of 22.5.2010. 
See Marise Cremona: The Two (or Three) Treaty Solution: The New Treaty Structure of the 
EU, in: Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds.): EU Law after Lisbon, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012, p. 57.
37 Court of Justice of the European Union: Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 
31 January 2012. Case C-130/10 European Parliament v Council of the European Union, 
paragraphs 64 and 75 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62
010CC0130:EN:HTML; accessed 3 April 2012).
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integration of internal security and wider foreign policy rationales is clearly 
in line with the “consistency” requirement of Article 21(3) TEU – but in this 
respect the EU faces certain institutional challenges (see section 4.3 below).
3.4 Decision-making rules
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the “ordinary legislative 
procedure” (Article 294 TFEU) with qualified majority voting in the Council 
and co-decision by the European Parliament has become the standard 
decision-making procedure for AFSJ matters. The only exceptions38 with 
potential implications for the external dimension of the AFSJ are measures in 
the domain of family law (Article 81(3) TFEU: unanimity and consultation 
only of the European Parliament), measures in the field of criminal procedural 
law not already foreseen by the Treaty (Article 82(2)(d) TFEU: unanimity 
and consent only by the European Parliament), minimum rules in the domain 
of substantive criminal law in other areas than already defined by the Treaty 
(Article 83(1) TFEU: unanimity and consent by the European Parliament) 
and establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and extension 
of its powers (Article 86(1) and (4): unanimity and consent of the European 
Parliament). 
The negotiation and conclusion of formal agreements with third-countries is 
governed by Article 218 TFEU which provides for a decision of the Council on 
the opening of the negotiations (on the basis of a proposal by the Commission), 
the authorisation of the signing and the conclusion. In all of these cases the 
Council has to act by qualified majority, except if the agreement covers a 
field for which unanimity is required (Article 218(8) TFEU). By virtue of 
Article 218(7) TFEU the European Parliament’s consent is now required 
for all international agreements covering AFSJ matters to which either the 
ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure with consent 
applies, which means that only in the case of an agreement covering family 
law matters (Article 81(3) TFEU) would its conclusion not depend on the 
Parliament’s consent.
Two observations may be made with regard to these post-Lisbon decision-
making rules: The first is that the extension of qualified majority voting 
38  Referred to as “special legislative procedures”.
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with the “ordinary legislative procedure” to most AFSJ fields – including 
the former “third pillar” fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
and police cooperation – has definitely strengthened EU decision-making 
capacity: As in all EU policy fields qualified majority voting means that the 
pressure on diverging national interests to agree to compromises and not to 
delay a decision unduly increases significantly because of the risk of being 
outvoted, with beneficial effects on both the substance and the speed of 
decision-making. The second observation is that the Lisbon Treaty reforms 
have led to a massive strengthening of the role of the European Parliament 
with regard to the external dimension of the AFSJ, with parliamentary co-
decision or consent now being required to almost all EU acts. This constitutes 
a significant reinforcement of the EU-level democratic legitimacy basis of EU 
external action in this domain which – especially as regards most categories 
of international agreements – was largely missing before the Lisbon Treaty.
3.5 Differentiation: the implications of the “opt-outs”
While the Lisbon Treaty has simplified the treaty architecture regarding the 
AFSJ it has not removed the “opt-out” positions granted to Ireland, the UK 
and Denmark (whose opt-out is different because of its participation in the 
Schengen system). These have, on the contrary, even been expanded as the 
previously existing “opt-outs”, which applied only to the “communitarised” 
AFSJ fields of the “first pillar” (asylum, migration, border controls, judicial 
cooperation in civil matters) have now been extended also to the former “third 
pillar” fields (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) in order 
not to expose the three Member States concerned to the perceived risks and 
inconveniences of the “community mode” of decision-making now applicable 
to most AFSJ matters in the context of the new TFEU.39 This means that these 
three Member States now enjoy a comprehensive “opt-out” from new AFSJ 
measures, unless they make use of their right to a selective opt-in as defined 
in the applicable protocols,40 and are bound only by existing ones they have 
decided to opt into in the past. 
39 On the background and legal and political complexity of these “opt-outs” see Jörg Monar: 
The ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: ‘Schengen Europe’, Opt-outs, Opt-ins and 
Associates, in: Kenneth Dyson and Angelos Sepos (eds.): Which Europe? The Politics of 
Differentiated Integration, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan 2010, pp. 279-292.
40 By way of Protocol 21 on the position of Ireland and the United Kingdom in respect of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and Protocol 22 on the position of Denmark (OJ C 
83 of 30.3.2010), p. 295 and 299.
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Quite apart from the curious situation that the “masters of the treaties” have 
thus granted an in principle complete opt-out to three of their number from 
what is defined as a fundamental common treaty objective in Article 3(2) TEU, 
this also has implications for the external dimension of the AFSJ. According 
to Article 2 of the British and Irish and Article 2 of the Danish “opt-out” 
protocols,41 no provision of any international agreement concluded by the 
EU pursuant to the provisions relating to the AFSJ is binding or applicable to 
these three Member States. The territorial application of any such agreement 
is thus limited to the other Member States, constituting an exception from 
the general principle of EU international agreements applying to the entire 
territory of the Union.42 Certain “opt-in” possibilities for Ireland, the UK43 and 
Denmark exist, but there can be major political and/or legal obstacles to using 
these. The most prominent example is the EU/Schengen “common policy on 
visas” (Article 77(2)(a) TFEU) which is based on common visa requirements 
for short-stay visas for up to 90 days in a 180-day period applicable to the 
territories of the EU Schengen Member States (“Schengen visas”). As Ireland 
and the UK are not participating in the common visa system obviously they 
also cannot participate in any of the visa facilitation agreements concluded 
by the EU. The Danish position is even more complicated: Denmark is part 
of the Schengen group and thus therefore has a strong incentive to participate 
in the visa facilitation agreements. Yet its “opt-in” possibilities do not extend 
to measures that do not build upon the original Schengen acquis. As visa 
facilitation agreements fall into the latter category Denmark has to conclude 
legally separate visa facilitation agreements with the respective third-
countries even if the substantial provisions of these are identical with those of 
the respective EU/Schengen agreements.44 As a result of these various “opt-
out” arrangements the EU has had to negotiate and conclude such agreements 
with third-countries without three of its Member States, a peculiarity which 
41 Protocols 21 and 22 to the TEU and TFEU.
42 See Bernd Martenczuk: Variable Geometry and the External Relations of the EU, in: Bernd 
Martenczuk and Servaas van Thiel (eds.): Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges for EU 
External Relations, Brussels: Brussels University Press 2008, pp. 508-509.
43 Article 3 of Protocol 21 on the position of Ireland and the United Kingdom in respect of 
the area of freedom, security and justice, which provides “opt-in” possibilities for these two 
Member States, also applies to international agreements.(OJ C 115 of 9.5.2008).
44 See Steve Peers: EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2011 (third edition), p. 238; Florian Trauner and Imke Kruse: EC Visa Facilitation and 
Readmission Agreement, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS Working 
Document 290) 2008, p. 10.
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is also reflected in the consequent need to define at the beginning of the 
respective agreements the meaning of “Member State”. It is thus stated in 
Article 3 of the 2007 visa facilitation agreement with the Russian Federation 
that
For the purpose of this Agreement:
(a) ‘Member State’ shall mean any Member State of the European Union, with the 
exception of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland.45
The “opt-outs” have also forced the EU to introduce differentiation elements 
in its participation in multilateral conventions. The 2006 Council Decision on 
the conclusion by the EC of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the 2000 United Nations (“Palermo”) 
Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, for instance, thus states 
in Recital 5
the UK and Ireland are not bound by this Decision to the extent that it concerns the 
exercise of an external power by the Community in fields where its internal legislation 
does not bind the UK and/or Ireland,
and in Recital 6
This Decision is without prejudice to the position of Denmark under [the Danish 
Protocol], hence Denmark does not take part in its adoption and is not bound by it.46
Needless to say, such differentiation does not add to the credibility and 
coherence of the Union as an international actor in the AFSJ domain, especially 
as the “opted-out” Member States then frequently negotiate parallel bilateral 
agreements with the respective third-countries.47 The EU’s external posture 
is also not helped by the variations between the three “opt-outs”. As regards 
45 OJ L 129 of 17.5.2007, p. 3.
46 Council Decision 2006/617/EC, OJ L 262 of 22.9.2006, p. 34. – It should be noted, however, 
that Denmark,  Ireland and the UK adhered to the Protocol – which came under Community/
Member States “mixed competence” – alongside the Communit
47 Denmark, for instance, concluded in 2008 a bilateral visa facilitation agreement with Russia 
which was largely similar to the abovementioned EU-Russia agreement of 2007.
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EU readmission agreements, for instance, the UK has so far opted into all 
of them, Ireland into most of them and Denmark into none of them.48 The 
differentiation can even affect the external relations of EU special agencies: 
When the EU border management agency Frontex negotiates and concludes 
working arrangements with third-country authorities (see below) Ireland 
and the UK are not part of these arrangements as they do not participate in 
Frontex.
At this stage it is difficult to predict how much use Denmark, Ireland and the 
UK are going to make of their extended “opt-outs” after the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty and of the extent to which these “opt-outs” will then 
affect the AFSJ external dimension. The case of the recent 2011 EU Directive 
on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting 
Victims49 – which is of importance to potential common external action in 
this field – has, however, shown all the potential for further differentiation: 
The British government decided in 2010 to opt-out, although it revised its 
position in favour of an opt-in after the finalisation of the Directive.50
48 Further examples are given and analysed in Marise Cremona: EU External Action in the 
JHA Domain: A Legal Perspective, Florence: European University Institute (Working Paper 
Law 2008/24) 2008, pp. 28-30.
49 Directive 2011/36/EU, OJ L 101 of 15.4.2011.
50 UK Home Office: EU directive on human trafficking, 22 March 2011 
 (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ publications/about-us/parliamentary-business/written-
ministerial-statement/eu-direct-human-trafficking-wms/?view=Standard&pubID=869472).
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4  The post-Lisbon institutional framework of 
the external AFSJ dimension
4.1 The role of the EU institutions
The Treaty of Lisbon has reinforced the supreme political guidance function 
of the European Council with regard to the development of the AFSJ: By 
virtue of Article 68 TFEU it is the European Council that “define[s] define 
the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the 
area of freedom, security and justice”. This is not a purely formal role: 
Although the five-year programmes for the development of the AFSJ – of 
which the aforementioned Stockholm Programme is the latest – have been 
largely finalised at the level of the JHA Council, the European Council has on 
several occasions given a considerable political impetus to the development 
of the AFSJ. This also applies to the external dimension: The Santa Maria 
de Feira European Council meeting of June 2000, for instance, accelerated 
the development of the AFSJ external dimension by not only endorsing 
a set of priorities but also requesting a report on progress made with the 
implementation by the end of 2001.51 Another example is the adoption of 
the “Global Approach to Migration” by the European Council in December 
2005 which placed an increased emphasis on linking different external policy 
measures (including financial and development policy instruments) for 
achieving EU migration management objectives in the context of a reinforced 
cooperation with third-countries and requested the Commission to report 
on progress by the end of 2006.52 In each of those cases the prioritisation 
defined by the Heads of State or Government put some political pressure on 
the Commission and Council to accelerate progress along the lines indicated. 
It should also be noted that, according to Article 22(1) TEU, it is the European 
Council that has to identify the “strategic interests and objectives” of the EU’s 
external action in general: This reinforces its role as an overarching authority 
on any strategy involving external AFSJ issues.
AFSJ external issues are normally only substantially discussed at European 
Council meetings if several Heads of State or Government are particularly 
51 European Council: Presidency Conclusions Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19/20 
June 2002, Council document 200/1/00, paragraph 51. 
52 European Council: Presidency Conclusions European Council, 14/15 December 2005, 
Council document 15914/1/05 REV 1, paragraphs 8-10.
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concerned about any challenges in this field at that particular moment. This 
was the case, for instance, at the June 2011 European Council which followed 
a bilateral summit and joint letter of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 
and French President Sarkozy from April 201153 on the increased immigration 
pressure on the EU’s southern borders as a result of the political turmoil of 
the “Arab Spring”. This led to an “extensive debate” on migration challenges 
during the June European Council meeting and a new prioritisation of “a 
wide-ranging structured dialogue on migration, mobility and security” with 
the neighbouring countries to the south and east, including the development 
of conditional “mobility partnerships”.54
The semi-permanent President of the European Council, newly introduced by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, has according to Article 15(6) TEU the task to “drive 
forward” the work of the European Council and to ensure its “continuity”. 
The President would, thus, have the possibility to make the external AFSJ 
dimension more of a regular issue for the European Council and to get the 
European Council to exercise potentially more political leadership in this field. 
There is little indication that the current incumbent, Herman Van Rompuy, 
who it has to be said has had his hands full with the Eurozone troubles 
ever since he came into office, regards this dimension as one into which he 
wants to invest much political capital. Yet he has, in case of need, facilitated 
a measured response by the European Council. In the context of the 2011 
Mediterranean migration “crisis”, as presented by Prime Minister Berlusconi 
and President Sarkozy, for instance, he tried effectively to calm the waters on 
the migration challenges in the Mediterranean ahead of the aforementioned 
June 2011 European Council by warning that these challenges should not be 
exaggerated.55 
In terms of implementation of the external AFSJ dimension, the JHA Council 
remains the principal decision-making institution. As a “double” Council 
formation comprising both the ministers of interior and of justice it has to 
53 French Embassy to the UK: Franco-Italian Summit, 26 April 2011 
 (http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Letter-from-French-and-Italian).
54 European Council: Presidency Conclusions European Council 24/25 June 2011, Council 
document EUCO 23/11, pp. 1 and 10-11.
55 Le Soir (Brussels): Révoltes arabes : il ne faut pas « exagérer le danger migratoire », 
17.4.2011.
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integrate interests which do not always coincide. It is up to the JHA Council 
to approve all programming documents for the JHA external dimension,56 
whether these are submitted to the European Council for formal adoption 
or not, adopt all relevant legislative acts, take the decisions on the opening, 
signing and conclusion57 of international agreements in the AFSJ domain, 
approve the Commission’s negotiation mandates, decide on external risk 
assessments58 and define action priorities regarding specific third-countries 
or -regions59. The Lisbon Treaty reforms have slightly weakened the strong 
position of the Council as it now has to decide on (nearly) all legislation under 
co-decision with the European Parliament and has to seek its consent on the 
conclusion of practically all international agreements. 
As in the case of all Council formations the ministers have little time for 
substantive discussions so that most texts relevant to the AFSJ external 
dimension arrives on their desks as “A”-points ready for adoption. These 
texts are negotiated and finalised by the competent Council working groups, a 
process that often involves several working groups and complex coordination 
needs. In the case of the 2010 “Action-oriented paper on combating 
organised crime (especially drug trafficking) originating in West Africa”,60 
for instance, no less than six different working groups61 were involved until 
the Council approved the finalised text on 26 April 2011. With the Council 
AFSJ working groups being primarily focused on internal EU AFSJ issues 
(with representatives normally from the ministries of interior and justice) 
necessary additional expertise on relations with the third-countries concerned 
or the situation within them can be brought in by the Group on External JHA 
Issues (JAIEX), which gathers experts on international AFSJ issues from 
56 Of which the most important so far is the still valid “Strategy for the External Dimension of 
JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice” which was endorsed by the JHA Council on 1 
December (Council document 15446/05 of 6.12.2005).
57 After the consent of the European Parliament.
58 An example is the “Council conclusions on a Latin-American and Caribbean (LAC) 
organised crime analysis”, Council document 5070/4/10 REV of 21.5.2010.
59 An example is the “Action-oriented paper on strategic and concerted action to improve 
cooperation in combating organised crime, especially drug trafficking, originating in West 
Africa”, Council document 5069/3/10 of 25.3.2010.
60 Ibid.
61 The working groups on organised crime (CRIMORG), horizontal drugs issues 
(CORDROGUE), external JHA issues (JAIEX), Africa (COAFR), internal security 
operational cooperation (COSI) and migration (MIGR).
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the national ministries, and the respective regional CFSP working groups. 
The June 2010 Council conclusions on the creation of a Latin-American and 
Caribbean organised crime threat assessment report, for instance, involved 
the AFSJ organised crime group (CRIMORG) as lead group but also JAIEX 
and the CFSP group on Latin-America (AMLAT).62 
The JAIEX group finds itself in a key position below the political level of the 
Council a regards the preparation of decisions on the external AFSJ dimension. 
Yet, as indicated in the fourth report on the implementation of the Strategy 
for the External Dimension of July 2011, the fact that the group holds just 
one monthly meeting often prevents it from addressing urgent matters quickly 
enough, and JAIEX delegates also seem to have a tendency to present only 
their national positions rather than really discussing issues.63 It should be 
noted as well that the JAIEX group still remains subordinate to the authority 
of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which remains 
the supreme coordinating body below the level of the Council, and that there 
are other Council committees and working parties which have a key role in 
defining external priorities in their respective fields. These include the Strategic 
Committee on Frontiers, Immigration and Asylum (SCIFA), the Article 36 
Committee (CATS), which deals with external aspects of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, and the High Level Working Group on 
Migration and Asylum (HLWG) which analyses the situation in countries of 
origin and prepares external action plans in response to the identified challenges. 
A special position within the Council is the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator 
(CTC) who works under the authority of the HRVP but takes his instructions 
from and reports primarily to the JHA Council. The CTC not only coordinates 
counter-terrorism activities within the Council and monitors the implementation 
of EU counter-terrorism measures but can also be described as the Union’s 
chief counter-terrorism diplomat, as he has the task of ensuring the effective 
communication of EU objectives and cooperation offers to third-countries.64
62 Council document 9656/10 of 21.5.2010.
63 Council of the European Union: Fourth Implementation Report of the “Strategy for the 
External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice” by the Council 
Secretariat (JAIEX working party) - Period of Reference: January 2010–June 2011, Council 
document no. 11678/11 of 4.7.2011, pp. 11-12.
64 This task was reconfirmed by the Stockholm Programme: European Council: The Stockholm 
Programme, OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010, p. 24.
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The European Commission has greatly expanded its role in the AFSJ domain 
since the Treaty of Amsterdam, with there now being two Commissioners 
and two Directorate-Generals (DGs) – one for “Home Affairs” and one for 
“Justice” – in charge, and a formal right of initiative under the Treaties which 
covers the entire domain.65 Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1999 the Commission has more or less constantly pushed for the 
further development of the AFSJ external dimension through general policy 
recommendations,66 proposals for developing relations on AFSJ matters 
with specific third-countries or -regions,67 enhanced capacity building in 
third-countries and the negotiation of agreements with third-countries. Apart 
from substantive policy reasons, the Commission’s proactive conduct in this 
domain may also have been motivated by a certain institutional self-interest 
as it has allowed it to develop a more and more important role in a field that in 
the 1990s was still completely dominated by intergovernmental cooperation 
between the Member States.
As the executive institution of the EU and the one responsible for the 
implementation of the budget it has also often fallen to the Commission to 
respond fairly rapidly to crisis situations affecting the AFSJ through proposals 
for revised external action priorities including the use of EU funding 
instruments. The most recent example of this emergency executive function 
of the Commission has been the package of proposals the Commission 
presented to Council and Parliament on 4 May 2011 in response to the surge 
of immigration pressure on the EU’s southern borders in conjunction with 
the “Arab Spring” developments including both enhanced and new forms 
of cooperation (such as the establishment of “trust-funds”) with the third-
countries concerned.68 
65 By virtue of Article 76 TFEU, however, a minimum of one-quarter of the Member States 
can also introduce legislative initiatives in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, so that the Commission right is non-exclusive in these fields.
66 Key examples are the October 2005 Communication on a “strategy” for the external AFSJ 
dimension (COM(2005)491 of 12.10.2005) and the proposals for external action in the 
April 2010 Communication on the “Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme” 
(COM(2010)171 of 20.4.2010, pp. 58-64). 
67 A major example is the 2004 Commission proposals on making the JHA domain a 
priority action field in relations with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries 
(COM(2004)373, pp. 16-17, 21 and 23).
68 European Commission: Communication on migration, COM(2011)248 of 4.5.2011.
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The Lisbon Treaty has left the institutional position of the Commission with 
regard to the external AFSJ dimension largely unchanged, except for the 
fact it has to take into account the strengthened position of the European 
Parliament. Yet there is a structural change within the Commission which, 
although not caused by it, coincided with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty; the splitting of the AFSJ portfolio between two Commissioners 
(Cecilia Malmström and Viviane Reding) and the subsequent splitting (in 
2009) also of the old JHA DG into the new “Home Affairs” and “Justice” 
DGs. The full effects of this on the Commission’s role in this domain will 
probably only become clear over time. There are initial indications, however, 
that this separation of the “home affairs” and “justice” AFSJ fields may result 
in a less “joined-up” approach of the Commission as regards the external 
AFSJ dimension: In the Commission’s November 2010 Communication on 
action for implementation of the EU’s 2010 Internal Security Strategy – which 
was prepared by the DG Home Affairs – the section on “Internal security 
in a global perspective” did not contain a single reference to international 
criminal justice cooperation and relegated the external role of Eurojust to 
a footnote.69 There are also other Commissioners and their respective DGs 
whose responsibilities are often affected by AFSJ external issues, such as 
the domains of transport (Commissioner Siim Kallas), the fight against 
fraud (Commissioner Algirdas Semeta) and enlargement and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (Commissioner Stefan Füle). These also therefore 
need to be involved in decision-making on the respective external aspects.  
In relation with both the Council and the Commission, a hybrid structure 
has to be considered which – although not an institution in the formal sense 
– is surely the biggest institutional innovation introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty: the European External Action Service (EEAS). This “Service” is 
headed by the HRVP, and its staff has been drawn from the Commission 
(mainly from the DG External Relations and part of the DG Development), 
the Council (Policy Unit, DG E) and officials from the Member States’ 
foreign ministries (on temporary secondment). In spite of the comprehensive 
mandate (“external action”) which its title and the rapidly growing number of 
its personnel suggests, it seems unlikely that the EEAS will have any major 
impact on policy formulation in the external dimension of the AFSJ. Not only 
69 European Commission: The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a 
more secure Europe, COM(2010)673 of 22.11.2010, p. 3.
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have the Commission’s DG “Home Affairs” and “Justice” and the Council’s 
DG H (JHA) retained their respective external relations responsibilities, 
but the EEAS – which has its main focus CFSP and the external diplomatic 
representation of the EU – also lacks any unit in its “Global and Multilateral 
Issues” Department specifically tasked to cover external AFSJ matters. 
Perhaps more importantly, the HRVP (currently Baroness Catherine Ashton) 
has also so far stayed largely clear of major external AFSJ matters such 
as illegal immigration and the fight against international organised crime. 
During her high profile visit to Tunisia in February 2011, for instance, the 
HRVP avoided answering questions about migration challenges although 
thousands of Tunisian illegal immigrants had by that time already reached 
Italian shores.70 While CFSP issues (and the internal battles over the EEAS) 
have no doubt kept her busy enough, her abstention on the external AFSJ 
side is likely to be motivated also by the wish to avoid a potential turf war 
with the JHA Council and especially the ministers of interior, who have been 
accustomed during the last decade to handle “their” external JHA issues 
largely amongst themselves. Yet the EEAS itself could – as the Commission 
noted in its November 2010 Communication on the implementation of the EU 
Internal Security Strategy – bring to the AFSJ external dimension additional 
“skills and expertise” from the Member States and help with the deployment 
of expertise in the field to EU delegations abroad.71 The EEAS only started 
to function during 2011, so time will tell whether this potential is going to 
be realised.
As already pointed out, the European Parliament’s position with regard to the 
external side of the AFSJ has been much strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty 
through the extension of both its co-decision rights and its consent rights 
to the conclusion of international agreements. In addition the Parliament 
already had a strong means of influence in this field through its budgetary 
powers. The Parliament demonstrated its extended external relations powers 
on 11 February 2010 when it rejected– with an overwhelming majority of 378 
to 196 – the SWIFT Interim Agreement between the EU and the US which 
was intended to ensure continued access of US law enforcement authorities 
to the financial messaging data handled by the international SWIFT bank 
70 Focus Magazin (Munich): Ashton weicht Frage nach Migration in Tunis aus, 14.2.2011.
71 European Commission: The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a 
more secure Europe, COM(2010)673 of 22.11.2010, p. 3.
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consortium. This Interim Agreement had already been concluded by the 
Council and it provisionally entered into force on 1 February 2010, which 
was arguably a rather cavalier way of dealing with the Parliament’s newly 
extended powers of consent. In spite of intense lobbying not only from the 
Commission and Member States – most of which regarded transatlantic 
cooperation on financial messaging data of major importance for the fight 
against terrorist financing – but also from the US (including Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton) for which the agreement was crucial for the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP), the Parliament’s committee in charge 
of AFSJ matters (the LIBE Committee) successfully recommended to the 
plenary a rejection of the agreement. The grounds cited were inadequate 
data protection provisions, especially as regards access of the US to “bulk” 
rather than individually targeted data, the absence of a judicial authorisation 
requirement and lack of rules on retention and oversight.72 This forceful 
intervention of the Parliament in the external dimension of justice and home 
affairs, however, lost part of its moral strength when the EP voted through 
on 7 July 2010 the text of a hastily re-negotiated definite EU-US agreement 
which provided only limited additional data protection safeguards.73 This 
cleared the way for an entry into force of the agreement on 1 August 2010, 
but made the European Parliament’s earlier stance appear to have been 
influenced more by an interest in affirming institutional prerogatives than 
substantive policy reasons. Nevertheless the SWIFT case has shown that 
the Council and Commission as well as third-countries now have to reckon 
with the Parliament as an important factor in the external dimension of the 
AFSJ. During the re-negotiation of the SWIFT agreement the Commission, 
the Council Presidency and the US went to great lengths in briefing and 
communicating with the LIBE Committee – which is likely to set a precedent 
for future negotiations also. 
72 European Parliament: Draft Recommendation on the proposal for a Council decision on the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America 
on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union 
to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Rapporteur: Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, 
PE438.440v01-00, 3.2.2010.
73 Council of the European Union: Agreement between the European Union and the United 
States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the 
European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program, OJ L 195 of 27.7.2010.
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4.2 The role of the special agencies
The special agencies created in the context of the AFSJ – Europol, Eurojust, 
Frontex, the European Police College (CEPOL) and the new European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) – have functions primarily of internal EU 
information exchange, analysis and cooperation support. Yet all four have been 
vested with the power to negotiate agreements with third-countries or third-
country authorities. Europol has already concluded74 a range of agreements 
with third-countries on the sharing of strategic data (fight against organised 
crime and terrorism, in particular) and – wherever the data protection regimes 
of the respective countries allow it – also on the sharing of personal data (so-
called “operational agreements”). Operational agreements have been signed 
with eight countries and Interpol, the most far-reaching with the US (two 
agreements), Canada and Switzerland, and the less far-reaching “strategic 
agreements” with nine countries and two international organisations, 
including Russia, Serbia and Turkey,75 which from the EU perspective offers 
insufficient guarantees on the data-protection side. Eurojust can also enter 
into agreements with third-countries.76 The most advanced agreement-based 
form of cooperation exists with the US, which has also posted a Federal 
Prosecutor as liaison magistrate to Eurojust. A similar arrangement exists 
with Norway and Switzerland. Agreements have also been signed with other 
countries such as Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Iceland, as well as the Memoranda of Understanding with the Iberoamerican 
Network of International Legal Cooperation and the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime.77 Frontex can enter into “working arrangements” on technical matters 
74 The legal basis is now – after replacement of the original Europol Convention – Article 23 
of the Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol) 
(2009/371/JHA), OJ L 121 of 15.5.2009.
75 Current (September 2011) list taken from Europol website: 
 https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/ international-relations-31.
76 On the basis of Article 26 of the amended Eurojust Decision (Council Decision 2009/426/
JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 
2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, 
OJ L 138 of 4.6.2009).
77 All agreements currently (March 2012) in force are listed on the Eurojust website: 
 http://eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/Eurojust-framework/Pages/agreements-concluded-by-
eurojust.aspx.
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of operational cooperation,78 and has done so already with fourteen countries 
and two international organisations.79 CEPOL can conclude cooperation 
agreements with third-country training institutes, especially those from EU 
candidate countries and Schengen associates.80 The new European Asylum 
Support Office has been empowered to enter into “framework arrangements” 
with third-country authorities, in particular with a view to promoting and 
assisting capacity building in the third-countries’ own asylum and reception 
systems and implementing regional protection programmes,81 but – having 
become operational only in June 2011 – it has not yet used this possibility.
The scope of the international agreements or arrangements the special 
agencies can enter into – which need to be authorised by the Council or, in 
the case of the EASO, by the Commission – is limited by the absence of any 
operational powers or operational means they control. Yet the agencies can 
facilitate information exchange with third-countries as well as operational 
cooperation between the Member States and third-countries, and they can 
within their respective fields serve as interlocutors on the EU side for third-
countries or third-country authorities. There are also initial plans to allow for 
the posting of joint liaison agents of the agencies with EU delegations abroad, 
following the establishment of the EEAS. 82
It should be added that the special agencies can also influence EU decision-
making on external AFSJ issues via reports identifying external challenges 
– such as the aforementioned regular OCTA and TE-SAT reports of Europol. 
Some agencies – such as the European Network and Information Security 
78 On the basis of Article 14 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 
2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 349 of 25.11.2004.
79 The Russian Federation, Ukraine, Croatia Moldova, Georgia, the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States, 
Montenegro, Belarus, Canada and Cape Verde, as well as with the CIS Border Troop 
Commanders Council and the MARRI Regional Centre in the Western Balkans (Frontex 
website September 2011: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/external_relations/).
80 On the basis of Article 8(2) of Council Decision 2005/681/JHA of 20 September 2005 
establishing the European Police College (CEPOL), OJ L256 of 1.10.2005.
81 Articles 7 and 49 of the Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of 19 May 2010 establishing a 
European Asylum Support Office, OJ L 132 of 29.5.2020. 
82 See Madalina Busuioc and Deirdre Curtin: The EU Internal Security Strategy, the EU Policy 
Cycle and the Role of (AFSJ) Agencies – Promise, Perils and Pre-requisites (Study PE 
453.185), Brussels: European Parliament 2011, p. 10. 
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Agency (ENISA) and the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) – have no 
external power as such but can still make an input into the decision-making 
process through their monitoring function and expertise in their respective 
fields.
4.3 Challenges of consistency and leadership
As already mentioned, Article 21(3) TEU, second paragraph, provides for 
the Union to “ensure consistency between the different areas of its external 
action”, and such consistency is surely a crucial factor for the effectiveness of 
Union action on the international stage. The external dimension of the AFSJ 
faces a double consistency challenge, one between the different AFSJ fields 
themselves and one between the external dimension and other EU external 
policies:
As regards consistency between external action in the different AFSJ fields, 
the fact that the external dimension is still under the control of a single Council 
formation (the JHA Council) and that the aforementioned JAIEX group 
covers all external AFSJ matters has so far ensured adequate coordination 
across the different fields of external AFSJ action. Yet there could be a risk 
of a growing “drifting apart” of the external home affairs and external justice 
fields as a result of the aforementioned new separation of these fields within 
the Commission and the tendency also in the Council working structures for 
home affairs and justice issues to be dealt with by different meetings or even 
parts of meetings at different times.83 This could reduce the potential for a 
comprehensive and integrated EU approach especially on international law 
enforcement cooperation issues.
The second consistency challenge, the one between the AFSJ external 
dimension and other EU external policies, has been identified as such for 
quite a while. In his December 2008 report on the implementation of the 2003 
EU Security Strategy, High Representative Solana seemed to admit that there 
were serious shortcomings in bringing AFSJ objectives more systematically 
83 In the 2011 evaluation of the work and future of the senior Council committee dealing 
with police and judicial cooperation (CATS), it was noted that CATS meetings have been 
normally divided into two days, which are split between home affairs and justice delegates. 
While this was considered justified for a number of files, the evaluation recommended that 
“more synergy should be encouraged” as it could “provide a more comprehensive picture 
and avoid a fragmented approach” (Council document 13206/11 of 22.7.2011, p. 6).
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and concretely into the EU’s external relations strategy when he stated that, in 
conjunction with the fight against terrorism and organised crime, “[w]e need to 
improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions”.84 
In the context of the Stockholm Programme the European Council again 
stressed,  in December 2009, “the need for the increased integration of these 
policies [AFSJ] into the general policies of the Union”.85 One reason for the 
difficulties with this “integration” is the tendency of ministries and ministers to 
protect their respective turfs, The foreign ministries clearly have little interest in 
seeing their “foreign policy” agenda invaded by “home affairs” interests from 
the interior ministries, and neither do the interior or the justice ministers relish 
the prospect of the foreign ministers using the EU context for appropriating 
some of their themes and instruments to add sparkle and legitimacy to their 
sphere of action. It also does not help that the Foreign Ministers have tended to 
want to keep the deployment of EU policing and judicial cooperation capabilities 
for CSDP civilian crisis management purposes under their exclusive control, 
although these capabilities normally have to be provided by their colleagues 
from the interior and justice departments.86 
Tensions between external AFSJ and CFSP (or other) external policy 
objectives have not arisen frequently. One such case has been visa facilitation 
towards third-countries, an issue on which foreign ministers have often tended 
to favour earlier concessions to third-countries, whereas their colleagues from 
the ministries of interior who in general have made those concessions more 
conditional on internal security considerations and/or the parallel conclusion 
of readmission agreements which have become the EU’s primary external 
migration management instrument.87 In order to overcome these tensions a 
84 Council of the European Union: Report on the implementation of the European Security 
Strategy, Council document S407/08 of 11.122008, p. 4.
85 European Council: The Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010, p. 33.
86 In the 2008 “Future Group Report” the personal representatives of the Ministers of Interior 
criticised the current lack of “correlation” and “prior consultation” between the AFSJ and 
the CFSP/ESDP frameworks in relation to civilian crisis management operations. Council of 
the European Union: Freedom, Security, Privacy – European Home Affairs in an open world. 
Report of the Informal High-Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs 
Policy, Council document 11657/08 of 9.7. 2008, pp. 42-43.
87 On the importance of readmission agreements in this field, see Carole Billet: EC readmission 
agreements: a prime instrument of the external dimension of the EU’s fight against irregular 
immigration. An assessment after ten years of practice, in: European Journal of Migration 
and Law, vol. 12 (2010), pp. 45-79. 
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“common approach” on visa facilitation was agreed in December 2005 which 
consisted of the principle that a visa facilitation agreement would not take 
place if no readmission agreement was in place, the provision for monitoring 
mechanisms and suspension clauses in the agreements and the need for 
the Commission to consult with Member States in both the JHA and the 
geographical CFSP Council groups on its proposal for a negotiating mandate. 
In terms of ensuring coherence during the decision-making on the negotiating 
mandate, the “common approach” (which is still applicable) provides for the 
full involvement of both AFSJ and CFSP groups:
To ensure the coherence between issues relating to external relations on the one hand, 
and to freedom, security and justice concerns on the other, relevant JHA Council groups, 
in close consultation with the relevant geographical working groups, will prepare the 
adoption of negotiating directives in Council.88
It seems, however, that in practice cooperation with the geographical working 
groups does have its problems as the fourth report on the implementation 
of the Strategy for the External Dimension of July 2011 noted generally 
that joint meetings of the JAIEX group with geographical groups “have not 
proved very successful”.89
The TEU assigns a general responsibility for ensuring consistency of external 
action to the Council and Commission “assisted” by the HRVP (Article 21(3) 
TEU). Yet Article 18(4) TEU places a bigger emphasis on the responsibility 
of the HRVP as he “shall ensure the consistency of the Union’s external 
action” and shall be responsible for “coordinating other aspects of the 
Union’s external action”. In addition the General Affairs Council is entrusted 
with ensuring consistency in the work of the different Council formations 
(Article 16(6) TEU). With responsibilities for external consistency being so 
widespread and – as mentioned before – with the Treaties not putting CFSP 
or any other external policy domain “in the lead” – the HRVP (who chairs 
the General Affairs Council) might still be in the best position to monitor 
88 Council of the European Union: Common approach on visa facilitation, Council document 
16030/05 of 21.12.2005, pp. 3-4.
89 Council of the European Union: Fourth Implementation Report of the “Strategy for the 
External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice” by the Council 
Secretariat (JAIEX working party), Period of Reference: January 2010–June 2011, Council 
document no. 11678/11 of 4.7.2011, p. 11.
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and ensure consistency between the external AFSJ dimension and other 
policies. It remains to be seen, however, whether in the case of a serious 
clash of approaches or priorities between the JHA Council and other Council 
formations (or between Commissioners) – which have so far not emerged – 
the HRVP would have the political weight to make consistency prevail.
Overall the institutional architecture of the AFSJ external dimension is clearly 
one of considerable complexity with commensurate challenges to ensure 
consistency. This has also been recognised in the 2011 JHA External Relations 
Trio Presidency Programme which actually used the term “complexity”90 
with regard to the following “unofficial” organigramme of all entities with an 
impact on the AFSJ external dimension (see figure on opposite page).
As regards political leadership in the external AFSJ dimension the situation 
after the Lisbon reforms is almost equally diffuse: The European Council – as 
mentioned before – has a broad strategic leadership function, but it exercises 
this only intermittently, and often only when special interests of Heads of State 
or Government are at stake as in the case of the 2011 Arab Spring migration 
“crisis”. Neither its President nor the HRVP has so far shown any ambition 
to play a major role in this field. This leaves leadership largely to the two 
European Commissioners in charge (currently Cecilia Malmström for home 
affairs and Viviane Reding for justice) and to interest coalitions in the JHA 
Council where the agenda-setting powers of the Council rotating presidency 
continues to have some influence as well.91 While the Commission has clearly 
submitted most of the proposals regarding the external dimension of the 
AFSJ these proposals are normally heavily influenced or even determined 
by declared interests or suggestions from Member States – strongly reflected 
in the Presidency “Trio Programmes” (see next section), so that in practice 
leadership always has a strong ‘collective’ dimension.
90 Council of the European Union: JHA External Relations – Trio Programme, Council 
document 12004/11 of 4.7.2011, p. 2.
91 The Polish Presidency of the second half of 2011, for instance, identified the strengthening 
of cooperation with the EU’s Eastern neighbours in combating drug-related crime as one of 
the priorities of its programme, which is hardly surprising given its geographical position 
and internal drug-trafficking challenges (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Programme of the 
Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Warsaw 2011, p. 23).
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Source: 2011 JHA External Relations Trio Programme, Council document 
12004/11 of 4.7.2011, p. 23.
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5 Main forms of external EU AFSJ action
5.1 Strategy formulation and programming
Since the Tampere European Council of October 1999 the AFSJ has been the 
object of a steadily increasing range of strategy and programming documents, 
of which four categories can be distinguished.
The first are strategy documents for the development of the AFSJ as a whole 
in which the external dimension appears as one field of action amongst 
all the others. The main category of these are the multi-annual (five-year) 
programmes. The AFSJ external dimension has so far invariably been placed 
at the end of these programmes, which underlines its complementary role 
with regard to the objectives and strategy elements defined for the individual 
internal policy fields which are covered in the previous sections. The first 
two, the 1999–2004 Tampere “programme” (which actually took the form of 
“Presidency Conclusions” only) and the 2004–2009 “Hague Programme”, 
provided only in very general terms for a “stronger external action”92 and 
the “development of a coherent external dimension of the Union policy 
of freedom, security and justice as a growing priority”93, leaving detailed 
objectives and programming of action to specific AFSJ external strategies 
still to be elaborated. The 2009–2014 Stockholm Programme, however, 
provides in its final section not only for general principles, but also for a list 
of thematic priorities with “new tools”, geographical priorities, agreements 
with third-countries and common positions in international organisations.94 
This can be taken as an indication both for the increased political importance 
of the external dimension and the desire to set clearer points of reference 
for implementation programming. Whether such more detailed longer-term 
strategy-making is effective, however, is an altogether different question as 
it can be quickly overtaken by events (such as the 9/11 attacks or the 2011 
“Arab Spring” challenges).
92 European Council: Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, Bulletin-EU no. 10 
(1999), paragraphs 59-62.
93 European Council: The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the European Union, OJ C53 of 3.3.2005, p. 14.
94 European Council: The Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010, pp. 33-37.
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The second category of strategy documents are those focused on the 
implementation of the external AFSJ dimension itself. As the first of those 
one can regard the initial definition of priorities for the external dimension by 
the Feira European Council in June 200095 which were followed by external-
dimension specific “multi-presidency programmes” with increasingly 
detailed programming. These programmes were eventually followed by 
the more substantial and more focussed aforementioned “Strategy for 
the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” of 
December 2005 which remains the main framework programming document 
and covers thematic priorities, principles, delivery mechanisms and tools as 
well as structures and processes.96 The 2005 Strategy has survived for such 
a relatively long time because its elements – focused on strategic issues – 
are sufficiently general to allow periodic updating and retargeting at the 
implementation level with regard to key topics, regional priorities and changes 
in approaches and procedures. This retargeting is done every eighteen months 
through a combination of assessment and new programming. 
The assessments come in the form of the regular “implementation reports” 
on the external AFSJ Strategy prepared by the JAIEX working group. The 
implementation reports consist of a first part providing an overview of 
progress made during the last eighteen months and a second part identifying 
“areas for attention” which identify necessary priorities and other changes in 
the light of new challenges and problems which have become apparent during 
the reporting period. The most recent report from July 2011, for instance, 
made recommendations on institutional and procedural changes (JAIEX 
methodology and topics, coordination with other EU external policies), the use 
of EU financial resources, capacity building in third-countries and relations 
with the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood.97 The new programming takes 
the form of the “Trio Programmes” (successor of the former multi-presidency 
programmes) which are mainly based on the JAIEX implementation reports, 
95 European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19/20 
June 2002,  Council document 200/1/00.
96 Council of the European Union: A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA : Global 
Freedom, Security and Justice, Council document 15446/05 of 6.12.2005.
97 Council of the European Union: Fourth Implementation Report of the “Strategy for the 
External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice” by the Council 
Secretariat (JAIEX working party). Period of Reference: January 2010–June 2011, Council 
document 11678/11 of 4.7.2011, pp. 11-16.
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but also on discussions at the Council level and priorities of the three incoming 
presidencies. The most recent “Trio Programme” of the Polish, Danish and 
Cyprus Presidencies of July 2011, for instance, although addressing key 
issues in the “implementation report” (such as JAIEX methodology and 
reports), also placed a major emphasis on reinforcing the fight against drug-
trafficking,98 a major Polish priority, although this had not been identified as 
an “area of attention” in the 2011 implementation report.  
The third category of strategy and programming documents are those related 
to individual AFSJ fields. Specific strategy and programming documents 
defining objectives and priorities have been introduced for all major AFSJ 
policy fields, and during the last decade external dimension elements have 
become an integrated part of all of them. To give just two examples; first, 
in May 2008 the Council adopted an “External relations strategy in the 
field of judicial cooperation in civil matters” which defines primary areas 
of cooperation from jurisdiction issues to the taking of evidence, as well 
as working methods, primary target countries and preferred international 
forums (in particular the Hague Conference on International Private Law).99 
Second, in June 2011 the Council adopted “Conclusions on priorities for the 
fight against organised crime 2011–2013” which defines a range of external 
objectives in relation to internal priorities: the weakening of the capacity of 
organised crime groups active or based in West Africa to traffic cocaine and 
heroin to and within the EU; the mitigation of the role of the Western Balkans 
as a key transit and storage zone for illicit commodities destined for the EU 
and logistical centre for organised crime groups; and the reduction of the 
capacity of organised crime groups to facilitate illegal immigration to the EU, 
particularly via southern, south-eastern and eastern Europe, and notably at the 
Greek-Turkish border and in crisis areas of the Mediterranean close to North 
Africa.100 Such field-specific programming of external dimension elements 
is normally linked to objectives in other related fields. The above mentioned 
June 2011 “Conclusions on priorities for the fight against organised crime”, 
98 Council of the European Union: JHA External Relations – Trio Programme, Council 
document 12004/11 of 4.7.2011, pp. 5-6.
99 Council document 6571/1/08 REV 1 of 7.5.2008.
100 Council of the European Union: Council conclusions on setting the EU’s priorities for 
the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013, Council document 11050/11 of 
6.6.2011, pp. 4-5.
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for instance, have clear links with the relevant objectives of the 2009–2012 
EU Drugs Action Plan101 as regards action against drug-trafficking. Fields 
of action considered to be of major importance can also be singled out for 
specific external action programming on their own, as has been the case, for 
instance, for measures against trafficking in human beings.102
The fourth, and final, category consists of strategy and programme documents 
regarding specific third-countries or groups of third-countries. These range 
from external AFSJ objectives as part of general EU regional strategy 
documents – e.g. the external AFSJ objectives defined in the Commission’s 
Council endorsed 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Strategy 
Paper (which is still valid)103 – over specific AFSJ external regional action 
plans – e.g. the aforementioned 2010 Action-oriented paper on combating 
organised crime (especially drug trafficking) originating in West Africa104 
and the 2011 Council Conclusions on Cooperation in the Area of Justice 
and Home Affairs within the Eastern Partnership105 – to the formulation of 
country specific AFSJ external strategy elements –  e.g.  the quite specific 
objectives defined for JHA cooperation in the 2009 EU-Ukraine Association 
Agenda.106
The enormous recent proliferation of AFSJ external strategy and programming 
documents of general, field-specific and geographical orientation, is all the 
more noteworthy as there were hardly any such efforts made in the 1990s. 
This can be taken as an indication of the “mainstreaming” of the external 
AFSJ dimension across both all AFSJ fields and within EU external policy 
in general. Most EU external strategy formulations now comprise objectives 
directly related to the AFSJ. Examples are the strong emphasis on the fight 
101 Council of the European Union: EU Drugs Action Plan 2009–2012, Council document 
16116/08 of 21.11.2008.
102 Council of the European Union: Action Oriented Paper (AOP) on strengthening the EU 
external dimension on action against trafficking in human beings, Council document 
11450/5/09 of 19.11.2009.
103 European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, COM(2004)373 of 
12.5.2004, pp. 16-17.
104 Council document 5069/3/10 of 25.3.2010.
105  Council document 17596/11 of 28.11.2011.
106 Council of the European Union: EU-Ukraine Association Agenda, Council document UE-
UA 1056/2/09 REV 2 of 15.10.2009, pp. 14-16.
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against terrorism in the country strategy papers on Pakistan107 and the 
Philippines,108 and the highlighting of the need for more effective border 
management and action against corruption in the issuing of passports in the 
strategy paper on Russia.109 
However, while the external AFSJ dimension has clearly become part of 
external EU strategy formulation, this does not mean that it is perfectly 
integrated with other external policies. The aforementioned 2011 “Trio 
Programme” on JHA external relations110 contains in 23 pages only two 
references to the CFSP and nothing concrete on how, for instance, migration, 
police and judicial cooperation issues should be brought into CFSP strategy 
or what CFSP instruments should be used more specifically for AFSJ 
objectives. The same vagueness and lack of substance can be observed on 
the “other side”, i.e. CFSP strategy documents. In spite of the “European 
Union Security Strategy” and repeated European Council affirmations of the 
importance of the external AFSJ agenda for EU external relations, most of the 
country or regional policy and strategy papers – which are essentially CFSP 
guided – contain at best one or two vague references on how to approach 
internal security issues in relation to the respective third-countries, and this 
almost exclusively in the context of providing assistance for capacity building. 
A telling example is the “EU Policy” on the Horn of Africa111 adopted in 
December 2009. Although the Horn of Africa surely does not lack challenges 
as regards organised crime – the acts of piracy affecting EU shipping being 
the most visible aspect –, terrorism and illegal migration to the EU (the latter 
two are explicitly acknowledged), the Council’s policy document does not 
contain a single reference to AFSJ objectives or instruments in the sections on 
maximising the effectiveness of the EU’s response and synergies between EU 
instruments. Even when it comes to the need for the Union to “systematically 
address the spread of corruption”, no reference whatsoever is made to the 
objectives and range of external cooperation instruments which have been 
107 European Commission, Pakistan-European Community Strategy Paper 2007–2013, pp. 15-16.
108 European Commission, The EC-Philippines Strategy Paper 2007–2013, pp. 20-22
109 European Commission, Russian Federation Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013, pp. 8-9.
110 Council of the European Union: JHA External Relations – Trio Programme, Council 
document 12004/11 of 4.7.2011.
111 Comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.
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developed in the AFSJ context.112 This can be regarded as a direct reflection 
of the different strings of decision-making within the institutional framework 
(see above section 4.3).
5.2 Cooperation with third-countries
Any cooperation between the EU and third-countries going beyond diplomatic 
or informal exchanges requires the existence of formal agreements. In the 
external dimension of the AFSJ one can distinguish between multilateral 
or bilateral framework agreements concluded with third-countries in which 
cooperation on AFSJ matters is provided for as one of several fields of 
cooperation and agreements addressing specifically external AFSJ matters:
As regards the first category, the framework agreements, the EU has since the 
Treaty of Amsterdam more or less systematically sought to introduce certain 
external AFSJ elements into the negotiation and conclusion of such framework 
agreements. This applies, in particular, to “readmission clauses”, i.e., clauses 
providing for the principle of re-admission of nationals residing unlawfully in 
the territory of an EU Member State, cooperation on readmission issues and 
often also the later negotiation of a specific agreement on that matter. Over 
time the content of these clauses has been increasingly tightened. While the 
first ever readmission clause in the 1996 Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Community and the Republic of Vietnam was still relatively vague
[Annex III] The European Community recalls the importance that it and its Member 
States attach to the principle of readmission of nationals to their countries of origin, 
reference to which is made in the fifth recital of the preamble to the Agreement 113
the wording of one of the most recent clauses, the one used in the 2009 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of Albania, 
imposes the principle in much stricter terms:
[Article 81(1)] The Parties shall cooperate in order to prevent and control illegal 
immigration. To this end, the Parties agree that, upon request and without further 
formalities, Albania and the Member States:–- shall readmit any of their nationals 
112 Council of the European Union: An EU Policy on the Horn of Africa – towards a 
comprehensive EU strategy, Council document 17383/09 of 10.12. 2009, p. 12..
113 Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, OJ C136 of 7.6.1996.
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illegally present on their territories, – shall readmit nationals of third countries and 
stateless persons illegally present on their territories and having entered the territory of 
Albania via or from a Member State, or having entered the territory of a Member State 
via or from Albania.114 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks the EU has also regularly sought the insertion 
of counter-terrorism cooperation clauses in framework agreements. A recent 
example is Article 5 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with 
Indonesia (signed in 2009, but still awaiting conclusion) which provides 
in Article 5 for the signatories to cooperate generally in the prevention and 
suppression of terrorist acts and more specifically through
– exchange of information on terrorist groups and their support networks in accordance 
with international and national law;
– exchange of views on means and methods used to counter terrorism, including in 
technical fields and training, and by exchange of experiences in respect of terrorism 
prevention;
– cooperation on law enforcement, strengthening of the legal framework and addressing 
conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;
– cooperation on the promotion of border control and management, strengthening 
capacity building through the establishment of networking, training and education 
programmes, exchange of visits of high officials, academics, analysts and field 
operators, and organising seminars and conferences.115
 
The counter-terrorism clauses are based on a standardised model defined by 
the Council, but they vary in scope and detail depending on the specifics of 
EU relations with the respective countries and the demands put forward by 
them during the negotiations.
Apart from the insertion of clauses on specific AFSJ matters in framework 
agreements the EU has also increasingly sought to use such agreements 
114 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, OJ L107 of 
28.4.2009.
115 Council of the European Union: Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and 
cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and 
the Republic of Indonesia, of the other part, Council document 14032/09 of 21.10.2009, p. 
12.
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to create a broader framework for cooperation with partner countries on a 
wider range of issues in this domain. All Association Agreements (AAs) 
and Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) concluded during the 
last decade contain clauses on cooperation in various JHA fields in line with 
internal AFSJ objectives. In the case of the 2005 AA with Algeria, for instance, 
detailed provisions on AFSJ related institution-building, migration issues, 
the fight against organised crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism and corruption 
as well as on legal and judicial cooperation have been included.116 But the 
politically and institutionally less far-reaching Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs) have also provided pathways for broader cooperation on 
AFSJ related issues. The 1997 PCA with the Russian Federation, for instance, 
provided a basis for the development of the “EU-Russia Common Space on 
Freedom, Security and Justice” set up under the 2003 EU-Russia Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement which in spite of serious political and data-
protection problems has made possible, inter alia, cooperation progress on 
visa facilitation, drugs precursors, training of law enforcement agencies and 
border management cooperation.117 Even agreements primarily focused on 
economic issues can contain provisions on various AFSJ related matters, 
from the fight against drug-trafficking and money laundering to migration 
issues, enabling a broader cooperation.118 
Of the second abovementioned category of agreements, those addressing 
specifically external AFSJ matters, the EU has since the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam concluded 58, of which 21 are multilateral and 37 
bilateral agreements.119 The multilateral agreements consist mainly of the 
participation of the EU/Member States in AFSJ related international legal 
116 Articles 82-91 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between 
the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part, OJ L265 of 10.10.2005.
117 European Commission: EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress Report 2010 of March 2011 
(no pagination).
118 The Trade, Cooperation and Development Agreement with South-Africa, for instance, has 
provided a legal basis for the establishment of a “Migration Dialogue Forum” which focuses 
on information exchange and best practice transfer and also covers issues of asylum and 
trafficking in human beings. Council of the European Union: EU-South Africa Cooperation 
Council: Migration Report, Council document UE-ZA 4913/11 of 12.9.2011.
119 European Commission Treaties Office Database: List of agreements in the fields of “Justice, 
freedom and security”, 
 (http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/AdvancedSearch.do; accessed 3.4.2012).
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instruments – such as the 2007 (“Lugano II”) Convention on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters120 (which has replaced the 1988 Lugano Convention) – and the 
agreements concluded with Iceland, Norway, the Swiss Confederation and 
Liechtenstein concerning aspects of their association with the Schengen 
system. The majority of the bilateral agreements concern cooperation on 
readmission and visa facilitation, but there are also agreements on criminal 
justice121 and cooperation on law enforcement122 as well as the association 
of third-countries with the EU’s Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction. A special sub-category consists of the agreements which Europol, 
Eurojust, Frontex and the EASO (see above section 4.2) can conclude with 
third-country authorities. While the number of these agreements is steadily 
increasing – Europol alone has already concluded eighteen agreements with 
third-countries and three with international organisations123 – their scope 
is limited to the exchange of certain categories of information, support for 
operational cooperation between national authorities and training. 
The range of agreements specifically concluded on AFSJ issues in particular 
shows how the EU has become an actor in its own right in the AFSJ external 
dimension, and that it has as such also been recognised by third-countries. 
The already mentioned simplification of the treaty architecture and the formal 
codification of the EU’s legal personality by the Treaty of Lisbon can further 
facilitate the negotiation and conclusion of cooperation agreements with 
third-countries in this domain. The Stockholm Programme states explicitly 
that
120 Council Decision 2009/430/EC (OJ L 147, 10.6.2009).
121 Such as the aforementioned 2003 EU-US agreements on extradition and mutual legal 
assistance (both OJ L181 of 19.7.2003) – which because of lengthy ratification procedures 
only entered into force on 1 February 2010 – and the EU-Japan agreement on mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters (OJ L39 of 12.2.2010).
122 Such as the 2010 “Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America 
on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the 
United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program” (OJ L195 of 
27.7.2010). The “second-generation” PNR agreements with Australia, Canada and the US 
currently in the process of ratification also fall within this category.
123 Europol: International Relations (https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/
international-relations-31; accessed 3.4.2012).
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The new basis under the Treaty for concluding international agreements will ensure 
that the Union can negotiate more effectively with key partners. The European Council 
intends to capitalise on all these new instruments to the fullest extent.124 
It identifies agreements on data protection, judicial assistance, extradition, 
trafficking in human beings, visa facilitation, readmission and civil law as 
primary fields for such action.125
At the same time, the persistent limitations of the EU’s possibilities to 
establish agreement-based cooperation frameworks with third-countries are 
evident. Unless the EU has completely pre-empted a field by common internal 
and/or external action, the current system of “shared competences” and the 
protection of essential state functions in the internal security field means that 
Member States remain free individually to conclude agreements with third-
countries – a freedom which is amply used in line with national interests. 
A recent example is the agreement which Germany signed with the US on 
1 October 2008 on access to biometric data and the spontaneous sharing of 
data about known and suspected terrorists, which also provides for mutual 
assistance in preventing serious threats to public security, including terrorist 
entry into either country. There was no EU involvement in the negotiation 
of this agreement, and only its preamble contains a vague reference to an 
expectation that other EU Member States might follow the model of this 
agreement.126 Bilateralism clearly also remains a major factor in cooperation 
on readmission with third-countries,127 and even the ECJ’s upholding in the 
Lugano Opinion128 of an implied exclusive competence of the Community 
as regards jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil matters has not entirely ended Member States’ individual international 
124 European Council: The Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010, p. 34.
125 Ibid., pp. 11, 17, 22, 31 and 34-35.
126 Deutscher Bundestag: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zu dem Abkommen vom 1. Oktober 2008 
zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der Vereinigten 
Staaten von Amerika über die Vertiefung der Zusammenarbeit bei der Verhinderung und 
Bekämpfung schwerwiegender Kriminalität, Drucksache 16/13123, 25 May 2009. 
127 See Jean-Pierre Cassarino: Resilient Bilateralism in the Cooperation on Readmission, in: 
Marise Cremona, Jörg Monar and Sara Poli (eds.): The External Dimension of the European 
Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 2011, pp. 191-
208.
128 Opinion 1/03 (Lugano Convention) [2006] ECR I 1145.
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action possibilities in this latter field.129 The continuation of separate bilateral 
treaty-making by Member States surely does not add to the cohesiveness and 
credibility of the Union as an international actor on internal security matters. 
Another limitation is due to the fact that the Union has no “operational 
capabilities” in the sense of deployable personnel (police, judicial or 
other) and technical means of its own to participate in joint operations (law 
enforcement, intelligence sharing, border protection, migration management, 
etc.) as all these capabilities remain at the level of the Member States. This 
reduces both the potential scope of agreements and the attractiveness of 
concluding agreements with the EU from the perspective of third-countries 
which may still achieve more effective operational cooperation arrangements 
by concluding bilateral agreements with individual Member States. 
5.3 Capacity building in third-countries
Although part of EU cooperation with third-countries and based on bilateral 
agreements, capacity building can be considered as a separate form of AFSJ-
related external action as, rather than being aimed at merely cooperating with 
third-countries, it is aimed at transforming their JHA systems for them to fit in 
better with AFSJ-defined objectives. According to the EU’s aforementioned 
external AFSJ Strategy of 2005: “EU funding and expertise provide important 
support for institutional and capacity building in third countries across a 
range of JHA areas, from law enforcement to border control”, something 
which is considered “essential to the rebuilding and transformation of weak 
law enforcement institutions and court systems”.130 Such capacity building 
– which has become the financially most substantial form of action of the 
129 See Jan-Jaap Kuipers: The External Exclusive Competence of the Community under Article 
81 TFEU. Lugano re-opened?, in: Marise Cremona, Jörg Monar and Sara Poli (eds.): The 
External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 2011, pp. 287-320.
130 Council of the European Union: A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA : Global 
Freedom, Security and Justice, Council document 15446/05 of 6.12.2005, p. 4.
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external dimension of the AFSJ131 – is based on the simple rationale that 
one can transform third-countries into more effective cooperation partners 
for addressing external challenges to the AFSJ by building-up their national 
capabilities in terms of organisation, infrastructure, training and legal 
framework. External capacity building measures have been developed in 
most AFSJ policy fields, from asylum and immigration policy over border 
control and surveillance to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
External AFSJ capacity building was tried out for the first time – and on a 
large scale – with regard to the candidate countries during the pre-accession 
process of the 2004 enlargement. Because of the major leverage provided by 
pre-accession conditionality, EU capacity building objectives regarding the 
accession countries attained their objectives to a large extent, although in the 
case of Bulgaria and Romania it was felt necessary to add a post-accession 
“Cooperation and Verification Mechanism” to keep up the pressure on those 
two new Member States after their accession in 2007 regarding compliance 
with EU implementation capacity targets.132 
The (relatively) successful programme of accession-related external capacity 
building in the AFSJ domain has provided a model for EU attempts to 
enhance the capabilities of a much wider range of third-countries. These have 
in fact become an important part of overall external strategy. The capacity 
building objectives are particularly wide-ranging on the external side of AFSJ 
131 External AFSJ capacity building uses a range of different EU policy and geographical 
budget lines. Amongst the most important in the 2012 budget are: budget item 19 02 01 
(cooperation with third countries in the field of asylum and immigration), Euro 57.6 million; 
budget item 19 06 01 (crisis response and preparedness, Instrument for Stability, can be 
used, inter alia, for capacity building in rule of law): Euro 232.8 million, budget item 19 
06 03 (transregional actions in the fight against organised crime, trafficking and terrorism): 
Euro 22.0 million, budget item 19 08 01 01 (ENP financial cooperation with Mediterranean 
countries, basis for capacity building on a range of JHA issues, including promotion of 
rule of law and fight against illegal immigration): Euro 1.2439 billion, budget item 19 08 
01 03 (ENP financial cooperation with Eastern Europe, basis for capacity building on a 
range of JHA issues, including fight against corruption and illegal immigration): Euro 728.4 
million; and budget item 19 08 02 01 (cross-border cooperation at EU external under the 
European Neighbourhood and partnership Instrument, including fight against organised 
crime and ensuring secure borders): Euro 92.8 million (commitment appropriations, all 
figures rounded; OJ L 56 of 29 February 2012). 
132 See Sandra Lavenex: Channels of Externalisation of EU Justice and Home Affairs, in: 
Marise Cremona, Jörg Monar and Sara Poli (eds.): The External Dimension of the European 
Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 2011, pp. 125-
126.
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internal security objectives where they partially overlap with CFSP/ESDP 
objectives as regards security sector reform (SSR) in third-countries.133 The 
global context of many of the EU’s internal security challenges has resulted in 
countries that are even more geographically remote being targeted by capacity 
building measures. The support provided by the EU to the Jakarta Centre 
for Law Enforcement for its training programmes in the fight against trans-
national crime is an example.134 Yet most of the capacity building is currently 
focused on the ENP and Western Balkan countries as they constitute, in a 
sense, the Union’s external “glacis” when it comes to preventing crime and 
migration challenges from reaching and crossing the EU’s external borders. 
Enhancing neighbouring countries’ law enforcement and border management 
capabilities has so far clearly been the predominant rationale of these capacity 
building efforts, for which the external AFSJ approach to the Mediterranean 
is a primary example.135 Measures can address all major internal security 
issues from terrorism through organised crime to illegal immigration, using 
a wide variety of instruments from the transfer of technical expertise and 
training through advice on legislation and the restructuring of police, court 
and border management services to the funding of equipment. One of the 
operationally most advanced examples is the EU Border Assistance Mission 
to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), established in 2005, which in 2010 
alone involved 99 customs and border police experts from the EU Member 
States for advice, training and risk analysis development as well as significant 
equipment procurement with a total annual budget of Euro 12 million.136 
In most cases, the capacity building is based on objectives, practices and 
standards applied within the EU (or at least the Member States in charge 
of a certain assistance measure), so that this sphere of external action has a 
133 See Panos Koutrakos: The External Dimension of the AFSJ and Other EU External 
Policies: An Osmotic Relationship, in: Marise Cremona, Jörg Monar and Sara Poli (eds.): 
The External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 2011, pp. 152-160.
134 Under the EuropeAid project 127452 “Support to improved security by provision of capacity 
building to the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Co-operation (JCLEC)”.
135 See Francesca Longo: The Mediterranean Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, in: Marise Cremona, Jörg Monar and Sara Poli (eds.): The External Dimension of 
the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 
2011, pp. 367-388. 
136 European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine: Annual Report 1 
December 2009–30 November 2010, Odessa (Ukraine) 2011.
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clear dimension of intended “system export”. This may include the transfer of 
even very specific AFSJ governance mechanisms. An example is the efforts 
made in the cooperation with the Western Balkan countries in the field of 
counter-terrorism to transfer EU know-how and practices regarding peer 
review procedures. It involves members of national counter-terrorism units of 
both the Member States and the participating Balkan countries137 and covers 
best practices in coordination of prosecutions, inter-agency cooperation, 
the use of intelligence as evidence and the provision of the legal base for a 
range of investigative techniques. From July 2008 to May 2009 the EU then 
sent expert missions to the respective Balkan countries with the objective 
of (1) introducing the main aims and the context of counter-terrorism peer 
evaluations, (2) presenting the outcomes and recommendations of the 
first round of peer evaluations, (3) explaining the added value of the peer 
evaluation recommendations, and (4) pointing out that the recommendations 
were a strong tool for improving national counterterrorism structures, in 
particular because they helped to push forward amendments to the national 
legal framework.138 Not only the peer evaluation framework but also the 
methodology used – the elaboration of questionnaires which are then 
used as a basis for the self-assessment of counter-terrorism structures and 
arrangements in the participating countries – mirrors largely the use of peer 
evaluations within the AFSJ, so that the aim of exporting an EU governance 
feature to the partner countries could hardly be more obvious. In July 2011 
the Austrian government proposed in the Council to engage in similar efforts 
to transfer EU best practices to the Western Balkan countries as regards asset 
recovery, cross-border surveillance, crime scene investigations, undercover 
operations, witness protection and anti-corruption measures.139
Although internal security objectives remain predominant, external AFSJ 
capacity building has also extended to refugee support and migration 
management measures in third-countries. In response to increasing numbers 
137 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia.
138 Council of the European Union: Implementation of the Council Conclusions on the co-
operation with Western Balkan countries on the fight against organised crime and terrorism 
– interim report, Council document 10232/1/09 REV 1, 28.5.2009, pp. 3-4. 
139 Council of the European Union: Police Equal Performance (PEP) – an initiative for a focused 
operational approach in the cooperation between the EU and the Western Balkans in fighting 
serious and organised crime, Council document 11224/11 of 7.6.2011.
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of asylum seekers and refugees in North Africa, from 2005 onwards the 
EU started to fund a range of capacity building programmes in migration 
management and the delivery of support services to refugees by governments, 
international organisations and civil society organisations in North Africa, 
this often in close cooperation with the UNHCR.140 The current EU-
Morocco Action Plan, for instance, includes specifically the development of 
appropriate administrative infrastructure to process and follow up asylum 
applications through cooperation, in particular as regards training for the 
staff concerned.141 Specific capacity building measures are also carried out 
as part of the EU’s “Regional Protection Programmes” which are aimed at 
increasing asylum and refugee protection capabilities in partner countries. An 
example was the 2009–2011 Regional Protection Support Project in Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine funded by the EU and implemented by the UNHCR. 
This involves joint missions with the participation of the governments, NGOs 
and the UN Refugee Agency, and training sessions on international refugee 
law and human rights for asylum authorities, border guards, police officers 
and judges.142
In terms of future prospects the Treaty of Lisbon slightly enhances the legal 
basis for further measures on the capacity building side: Articles 67(2) 
and 80 TFEU provide explicitly for the first time for “solidarity” between 
Member States and a “fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial 
implications”. This could strengthen the Commission’s hand in proposing 
financially more ambitious external capacity building measures in these 
fields – for which the negotiations on the new EU Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2014–2020 will provide a major opportunity.
In the Stockholm Programme, external capacity building is given a prominent 
place. Specifically mentioned fields of action include; support for the 
reform of justice systems, for well-functioning infrastructures and sufficient 
administrative capacity to handle all aspects of migration (especially in 
the context of “Mobility partnerships” with countries of origin, transit and 
140  See Johannes van der Klaauw: Multi-dimensional migration challenges in North Africa, in: 
Forced Migration Review, No. 28, 2007.
141 European Commission: EU/Morocco Action Plan, 27.7.2005, action 46.
142 UNHCR: Second Regional Steering Committee of the Regional Protection Support Project 
meets in Kyiv (Press release), Kyiv April 2010.
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destination), for capabilities in the fight against illegal immigration and 
trafficking in human beings, for the improvement of border management 
systems and for effective asylum protection capabilities of third countries, 
this also in the context of the Regional Protection Programmes.143 Emphasis is 
placed on the need for financial instruments to be made more flexible to allow 
for a mor rapid response to requests, especially in the fields of the fight against 
organised crime and terrorism and migration management.144 The complexity 
of EU budgetary rules and procedures has indeed often made it difficult to 
adapt capacity building programmes to newly identified deficits and rapidly 
changing crime risks in the respective third-countries. The Programme’s 
identified geographic priorities for capacity building with internal security 
relevance include the Western Balkans (organised crime and corruption), 
the ENP countries (capacity and institution-building for an independent and 
impartial judiciary, law enforcement authorities and anti-corruption efforts), 
the Black Sea region (border and migration management, fight against cross-
border crime), the Mediterranean (border and migration management and 
fight against drug trafficking) and West Africa (fight against drug trafficking 
and other transnational crime).145 More remote regions and countries are 
mentioned as well, but it is noticeable that the more geographically remote, 
the vaguer the wording in terms of potential capacity building measures, so 
that the focus clearly remains on the Union’s neighbouring countries.
While the rationale of third-country capacity building as one way of reducing 
external challenges for the AFSJ seems compelling enough, it has its 
problematic side when it comes to implementation. The potential and limits of 
the Union’s possibilities to bring third-countries to adopt or at least cooperate 
on EU internal security objectives and standards depend crucially on the 
Union’s political leverage.146 In the case of the Western Balkan countries, the 
EU membership perspective clearly accounts for a greater leverage than, for 
instance, for ENP countries that do not have such a perspective. The European 
143 Council of the European Union: The Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010, pp. 17, 
26, 28, 31 and 33-35.
144 Ibid., pp. 7 and 28.
145 Ibid., pp. 34-36.
146 See Sandra Lavenex: Channels of Externalisation of EU Justice and Home Affairs, in: 
Marise Cremona, Jörg Monar and Sara Poli (eds.): The External Dimension of the European 
Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 2011, pp. 130-
132.
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Commission’s progress reports on ENP partners147 confirm that, in spite of 
capacity building assistance, progress can be very limited if this leverage is 
low or non-existent. Examples are the persisting significant shortcomings of 
Azerbaijan as regards the fight against corruption and money-laundering,148 
the continuing deficits of national capabilities and legislation with regard to 
asylum and trafficking in human beings in the Ukraine,149 the still “totally 
unsatisfactory” reform of the judiciary in Tunisia in spite of major EU 
efforts,150 and the almost complete lack of progress regarding the putting into 
place of an effective legislative framework for asylum and refugee policy 
which the Commission reported, again, for Morocco in 2011.151 
The fact that the Commission has to contract out many of the capacity building 
measures to other international organisations and non-public contractors is 
also not always a guarantor of quality. As scarce public resources – probably in 
the future even scarcer as a result of the financial crisis – are invested in third-
country capacity building, a more critical monitoring of the effectiveness of 
such measures is clearly necessary. The Stockholm Programme explicitly 
recognises the need for a more effective evaluation, transparency and 
accountability-based implementation of capacity building measures.152 
Another problem of AFSJ-related capacity building abroad is that the 
EU cannot always be sure that the upgraded capabilities of third-country 
governments will only be used for the legitimate purposes EU policy-makers 
have in mind. In a discussion paper of June 2011 the EU’s Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, warned about the repressive policies of 
third-countries with which the EU is having a counter-terrorism dialogue 
actually contributing to the spread of terrorism through these policies and 
emphasised the need for making human rights an essential component of EU 
counter-terrorism capacity building in third countries.153 
147 See the Commission’s latest ENP individual country progress reports (European 
Commission, SEC(2011) 637-652, 25.5. 2011).
148 SEC(2011) 640, 25.5.2011, pp. 4 and 11.
149 SEC(2011) 646 , 25.5.2011, p. 15.
150 SEC(2011) 652, 25.5.2011, p. 4.
151 SEC(2011) 651, 25.5.2011, p. 15.
152 Council of the European Union: The Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010, p. 33.
153 EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator: EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy – Discussion paper, 
Council document 10622/1/11 REV 1, 7.6.2011, p. 6.
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5.4 Cooperation with and within international organisations
International organisations, especially the UN, the Council of Europe, the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), constitute important frameworks 
for pursuing external AFSJ objectives. In many fields seeking progress 
within the framework of international organisations is the most effective way 
to pursue common external AFSJ interests at a multilateral level, this not 
only because of an existing international organisational framework but also 
because previously established multilateral conventions bind the EU Member 
States. The primary fora for multilateral action by the EU in the fight against 
corruption, for instance, thus remain the UN, the Council of Europe and the 
OECD.154 The internal EU controversies surrounding the implementation 
of UN Security Council Resolutions regarding the freezing of funds and 
financial resources of individuals and entities suspected of being involved 
in terrorist financing – which led to the ECJ’s landmark judgment on the (in)
famous “terrorist listing” in the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases155 – has shown 
that the legal obligations defined in the context of international organisations 
can also raise fundamental questions about the extent to which the EU is a 
mere instrument of execution of these obligations or retains a certain degree 
of autonomy and the capacity to maintain its own benchmarks in a important 
field such as counter-terrorism.156
There can be no question that the EU has increasingly asserted its position 
within international organisations as an actor on various JHA matters – in 
line with the growth of its internal powers – since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. Major indicators of this increasing actorness within 
international organisations are the Community (now Union) adhesion to 
154 See Valsamis Mitsilegas: The European Union and the Implementation of International 
Norms in Criminal Matters, in: Marise Cremona, Jörg Monar and Sara Poli (eds.): The 
External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 2011, pp. 241-242.
155 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission 
[2008] ECR I-6351.
156 See Piet Eeckhout: Kadi and the EU as Instrument or Actor. Which Rule of Law for Counter-
Terrorism?, in: Marise Cremona, Jörg Monar and Sara Poli (eds.): The External Dimension 
of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang 
2011, pp. 326-335 and 338.
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the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo 
Convention), to its three Protocols regarding the prevention of illicit 
manufacturing and trafficking in firearms, the prevention of the smuggling 
of migrants and the prevention of trafficking of persons, and to the 2003 
UN Convention against Corruption.157 In the domain of international judicial 
cooperation in civil matters also the EU has been able to increase its presence 
significantly as is shown by its accession in 2007 to the Hague Conference on 
International Private Law and its subsequent signing in 2009 of the (Hague) 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and in 2011 of the 2007 (Hague) 
Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms 
of Family Maintenance.158 The Union is also making use of its ability to 
define formal “Common Positions” – as was the case, for instance, in the third 
session of the Conference of the States Parties to the UN Convention against 
Corruption in Doha in November 2009159 – and it maintains a dialogue with 
international organisations to facilitate the coordination of activities, such as 
with the Council of Europe in the criminal law field.160
International organisations are also important partners and channels for EU 
capacity building measures. The EU’s financial and operational involvement 
in counter-terrorism capacity building efforts regarding vulnerable third-
countries (such as Mali, Mauretania, Niger and Pakistan) in close cooperation 
with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UN 
CTED) is a major example of that.161 
The Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the position of the Union in international 
organisations through the already mentioned introduction of a single EU legal 
157 Council Decisions 2001/748/EC (OJ L 280, 24.10.2001), 2004/579/EC (OJ L 261 of 
6.8.2004), 2006/616/EC, 2006/617/EC, 2006/618/EC, 2006/619/EC (all OJ L 262, 
22.9.2006) and 2008/801/EC (OJ L 287 of 29.10.2008).
158  Council Decisions 2006/719/EC (OJ L 297, 26.10.2006), 2009/397/EC (OJ L 133, 
29.5.2009) and 2011/220/EU (OJ L 93 of 7.4.2011).
159 Council of the European Union: Adoption of draft Council Common Position on the UN 
Convention against Corruption – Preparation of the 3rd Conference of the States Parties to 
the UNCAC (Doha, Qatar, 9–13 November 2009), Council document 14176/09, 8.10. 2009.
160 See Council of the European Union: Summary of conclusions of the meeting between the 
Troika of the Article 36 Committee and the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 21 June 2010, 
Council document 11473/10 of 28.6.2010.
161 European Commission, “The Instrument for Stability – Multi-annual Indicative Programme 
2009–2011”, C(2009)2641, 8.4.2009, pp. 14-15.
69
personality as well as the new provision on Union delegations – under the 
authority of the High Representative for CFSP – representing the Union in 
international organisations (Article 221 TFEU). The Stockholm Programme 
underlines the importance of cooperation with and within international 
organisations, putting particular emphasis on the UN and the Council of 
Europe.162 Yet the relevant sections are rather vague in terms of objectives, and 
the failure to mention the OSCE is somewhat surprising considering its role 
in the south-eastern and eastern European neighbourhood which is related to 
many of the EU’s internal security-related capacity building efforts.163
162 Council of the European Union: The Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010, pp. 35 
and 37.
163 This has to some extent been remedied by the 2011 Trio Presidency Programme which 
identifies several elements for a “deeper cooperation” with the OSCE, including exchanges 
of good practice and the strengthening of ties with the Anti-Terrorist Unit. Council of the 
European Union: JHA External Relations – Trio Programme, Council document 12004/11 
of 4.7.2011, p. 21.
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6 Conclusions
6.1 Implications for the EU
For the EU as a whole, the emergence of the external dimension of the 
AFSJ appears to be a primarily positive development: It has allowed the EU 
gradually and with an increasingly wide range of external instruments to 
complement internal action on AFSJ objectives with external action. Because 
many of the challenges to which the AFSJ has to respond have a major – and 
in some cases, such as illegal immigration, even a primarily – external EU 
dimension (see section 2.2), the development of a corresponding dimension 
of external action constitutes a necessary part of the development of the 
AFSJ itself and of the effectiveness of its policies. The use of the combined 
political weight of the EU – regrouping both the Member States and other EU 
external policies of relevance to third-countries – has made it easier to secure 
cooperation of third-countries on a range of issues relevant to AFSJ, from 
readmission through anti-money-laundering measures to the sharing of law 
enforcement data. The adoption of common positions on fundamental AFSJ 
issues also offers the EU and its Member States a better chance to defend 
common interests – such as high standards of personal data protection in 
law enforcement cooperation – even against powerful external pressures like 
those of the US in the context of counter-terrorism cooperation.164 
Moreover, the benefits which the external AFSJ dimension brings to the EU 
do not stop with the added benefits they bring in terms of contributing to 
achieving the AFSJ’s internal objectives. The rapid growth of this domain 
of EU external action since 1999 has added a substantial new dimension 
to the Union’s role in international relations beyond its already established 
actorness in fields like trade, development and foreign and security policy. 
There can be no doubt that in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks the 
fact that the EU could – via its new external competences introduced by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam – become the agent of a collective international 
European response and be immediately accepted as such as an interlocutor 
by the US has added to its international weight and visibility. The same 
can also be said be said about visa facilitation as third-countries have had 
to accept that with the harmonisation of EU (Schengen) visa lists the only 
164 See Annegret Bendiek: An den Grenzen des Rechtsstaates: EU-USA-Terrorismusbekämpfung, 
Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 2011 (SWP-Studie S 3), pp. 13-14. 
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way of obtaining visa concessions has become to engage in negotiations with 
the EU as whole which, inter alia, normally means accepting readmission 
agreements in return.
However, there are also three more problematic implications of the emergence 
of the AFSJ external dimension:
The first is that this relatively “new” external dimension has added to the 
complexity of EU decision-making in the domain of external relations as a 
whole range of “new” issues, especially related to migration management 
and the fight against serious forms of crime, have entered the EU’s external 
agenda. This has generated additional consistency challenges for EU external 
policies and corresponding coordination needs between the different strings 
of decision-making (see section 4.3). These seem as yet not to have been fully 
mastered, especially as regards the integration of AFSJ external objectives 
within the CFSP and its wider foreign policy rationale. 
The second is that – as the EU has now become an actor in its own right on 
AFSJ external issues – it is inevitably also more exposed to third-country 
interests and pressures. Third-countries have quickly realised that it can be 
advantageous for them to seek an agreement on JHA issues of particular 
concern to them with the EU as a whole rather than to have to negotiate 
agreements with all or some of the Member States individually. This can 
result in third-countries trying to impose on the EU as a whole concessions 
on certain AFSJ matters which are controversial both amongst the EU 
institutions and in at least some Member States. A major example for this 
more problematic aspect of the EU’s newly gained international actorness 
is the aforementioned EU-US agreement on the collection, transfer and 
storing of PNR data in which the US Administration clearly tried to impose 
its counter-terrorist law enforcement interests on the EU side165 to the extent 
that in the end even the European Commission’s Legal Service expressed, 
with regard to the latest (still to be ratified) version of the agreement, “grave 
165 See, Vagelis Papakonstantinou and Paul De Hert: The PNR Agreement and transatlantic 
anti-terrorism co-operation: no firm human rights framework on either side of the Atlantic, 
in: Common Market Law Review, vol. 46 (2009), pp. 885-919.
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doubts as to its compatibility with the fundamental right to data protection”.166
The third more problematic implication is that – with AFSJ matters often 
involving major national interests – the external dimension of the AFSJ can 
expose the EU to serious tests of cohesiveness and solidarity, as occurred at 
the peak of the EU-US visa reciprocity problems in 2008. Frustrated by a lack 
of progress on refusal of the US to extend bilateral visa waiver arrangements 
to all new EU Member States, which was partly attributed to an insufficient 
willingness of the “old” EU Member States that benefited from the US visa 
waiver to put sufficient pressure on the US, on 26 February 2008 the Czech 
Government signed a memorandum of understanding with the US in which 
it agreed to an enhanced transfer of data on passengers, suspected terrorists 
and migration-related matters to the US in exchange for access to the US 
visa waiver programme, thereby seriously undermining the common EU 
position on these issues as well as the common visa policy in general. As 
five other new Member States – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and 
Slovakia – lost little time in following this demonstration of coherence of the 
enlarged EU, the Commission preferred not to take legal action against the 
‘bilateral’ approach, as it had initially indicated, focusing instead on a new 
round of negotiations with the US. Both inner-EU and transatlantic tensions 
over the issue were later largely defused by the US extending its visa waiver 
programme to the six “bilateralists”,167 but the case has shown the challenges 
of solidarity to which the external AFSJ dimension can expose the EU.
6.2 Implications for the Member States
As the AFSJ constitutes a fundamental common political EU project – 
with the qualification that the three “opt-outs” do not fully participate in 
it (see section 3.5) – the Member States obviously benefit generally from 
its external dimension making a substantial contribution to achieve AFSJ 
internal objectives which, especially in the case of fight against crime and 
migration management, address major concerns of their citizens. Yet there are 
166 European Commission, Legal Service: Note for the attention of Mr. Stefano Manservisi, 
Director-General, DG Home. Subject: Draft Agreement on the Use of Passenger Name 
Records (PNR) between the EU and the United States, 18.5.2011 (SJ(2011) 603245), 
available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/jun/eu-usa-pnr-com-ls-opinion-11.pdf
167 European Commission: Fifth Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on certain third countries’ maintenance of visa requirements in breach of the 
principle of reciprocity, COM(2009) 560, 19.10. 2009, pp. 6-10.
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additional benefits Member States can draw from EU external AFSJ action 
which depend on specific national interests and situations: 
Smaller Member States can benefit relatively more from the collective 
political weight of the EU when it comes to third-countries agreeing to 
concessions – for instance, on readmission of illegal immigrants and rejected 
asylum applications. Some Member States may be able to use the AFSJ 
external dimension to support their relationship with a major international 
partner – as the UK did with regard to its “special relationship” with the 
US when it acted as one of the protagonists in the EU of closer counter-
terrorism cooperation with the US in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. 
Still other Member States may have specific regional interests in migration 
management and the fight against crime which can influence priorities for 
cooperation with third-countries and capacity building. The Nordic Member 
States have thus often pioneered or influenced external AFSJ measures in the 
Baltic Sea region, the Eastern EU Member States cooperation with the EU’s 
eastern neighbours (now in the context of the “Eastern Partnership”) and the 
EU’s southern Member States cooperation priorities with the North African 
countries, especially regarding migration management.
The counterpart of the benefits and opportunities that the external AFSJ 
dimension offers to Member States is a loss of autonomy which ranges from 
fields with an extensive transfer of competences to the EU – such as visa 
policy – to fields where EU external action does not go beyond information 
sharing and capacity building – such as police cooperation. Given the major 
limitations of EU competences which persist after the Treaty of Lisbon 
reforms (see section 3.2) the “cost” for the Member States of the AFSJ 
external dimension in terms of restrictions on their autonomy of international 
action in this field can still be considered as relatively low – as is shown by the 
continuation of significant bilateral treaty-making with third-countries (see 
section 5.2).
6.3 Further development prospects 
The Treaty of Lisbon has strengthened the EU’s potential to further develop 
the external dimension of the AFSJ through the abolition of the “pillar 
structure”, the creation of a single legal personality, a unified procedure for 
the negotiation and conclusion of agreements, the extension of qualified 
majority voting and some extension of EU internal competence on AFSJ 
74
matters which – if used – could extend external action possibilities (see 
sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4). The 2009–2014 Stockholm Programme also 
places a greater emphasis on this dimension of the AFSJ than any of its 
predecessors. This – as well as the fact that the external challenges to the 
AFSJ continue to figure prominently in EU threat assessments – should 
contribute to a growing expansion of the AFSJ external dimension until the 
end of the current programming period and beyond. Such an expansion will 
not come without funding implications, especially in view of the EU’s interest 
in law enforcement and capacity building for migration management in 
(mostly neighbouring) third-countries. The negotiations on the forthcoming 
new Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 provide an opportunity 
to establish an adequate financial framework for the growth potential of the 
AFSJ external dimension. 
A number of factors will, however, continue to impact negatively on the 
potential for development of the external side of the AFSJ. The diversity 
of the fields covered – from asylum and immigration through civil and 
criminal justice to police cooperation – limits the potential for the external 
AFSJ dimension to develop into a single “policy”. The resulting relative 
fragmentation makes it more difficult for AFSJ external objectives to 
be given the same political weight as those of other more established and 
homogenous external EU policies (such as the CFSP, trade or development 
policy). This in turn contributes to the difficulties of its effective integration 
with other external EU policies, which is also hampered by different strings 
of decision-making and the complex post-Lisbon institutional structure (see 
section 4.1). If one adds to this the continuing limitations of the EU having 
only “shared” competences in the AFSJ domain, it seems clear that ultimately 
progress will continue to depend essentially on the extent of the Member 
States’ interest in common external action in this domain, which may vary 
considerably not only between the Member States but also from one case or 
issue to the other. As this interest is generally very much conditioned by the 
perception of international challenges and threats, it may well be that over the 
next few years the most important role for EU bodies – and in particular for 
the European Commission and the AFSJ agencies – will be to make Member 
States fully realise the nature and extent of the commonality of international 
challenges in the various AFSJ fields – and hence the need for corresponding 
common external action. 
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7 Sammanfattning på svenska
Det som inom Europeiska Unionen kallas för ”ett område med frihet, 
säkerhet och rättvisa” är i första hand ett politiskt projekt för att garantera 
EU:s medborgare ett område med fri rörlighet för personer.  Men projektet 
har också en internationell dimension: organiserad brottslighet, terrorism och 
illegal invandring gör inte halt vid EU:s gräns. De yttre hoten mot något så 
stort, öppet och sårbart som ”ett område med frihet, säkerhet och rättvisa” 
(den engelska förkortningen för ”area of freedom, security and justice”, 
AFSJ, används fortsättningsvis) måste bemötas.
I den här rapporten diskuteras först och främst hur den yttre dimensionen 
av AFSJ har utvecklats.  Även det juridiska och institutionella ramverket 
efter Lissabonfördragets ikraftträdande belyses. Därefter analyseras EU:s 
agerande och vilken betydelse den internationella dimensionen har för såväl 
EU som för medlemsländerna.
EU har kompletterat interna åtgärder inom unionen med externa för att uppfylla 
målen i AFSJ: allt ifrån strategiformulering och samarbete med tredje land, till 
kapacitetsbyggande och gemensamt agerande i internationella organisationer. 
Att på det sättet samla EU:s politiska tyngd har också gjort det lättare att 
samarbeta med länder utanför EU i viktiga frågor som återtagandeavtal, 
åtgärder mot penningtvätt och utväxling av polisinformation.
Sedan 1999 har framväxten av AFSJ:s yttre dimension gett unionen en helt 
ny roll internationellt – en roll som sträcker sig bortom den traditionella 
inom områden som handel, utveckling och utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik. 
Det råder inga tvivel om att EU efter terroristattackerna den 11 september 
2001 – genom de nya befogenheter man fick i Amsterdamfördraget – blev 
en samlad kraft för ett europeiskt agerande internationellt, en roll som också 
har accepterats av USA. EU:s roll har också stärkts globalt när det gäller 
exempelvis underlättande av visumhantering, där länder utanför EU har 
tvingats acceptera att det är nödvändigt att förhandla med hela unionen.
Lissabonfördraget ger EU möjlighet att ytterligare utöka den internationella 
dimensionen av AFSJ, genom avskaffandet av ”pelarstrukturen”, 
etablerandet av EU som juridisk person, införandet av en enhetlig procedur 
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för förhandlingar och ingående av avtal, ökat användande av kvalificerad 
majoritet vid beslutsfattande samt viss ökning av EU:s kompetens när det 
gäller AFSJ-området.
Även Stockholmsprogrammet 2009-2014 lägger större tonvikt vid den 
internationella dimensionen i AFSJ än någon av föregångarna. EU:s 
kartläggning av hotbilder kommer sannolikt att göra att man behåller detta 
fokus även under nästa programperiod.  Detta får givetvis konsekvenser för 
finansieringen, särskilt som EU har ett betydande intresse av polisverksamhet 
och migrationskontroll i angränsande länder. Förhandlingarna om EU:s 
långtidsbudget för perioden 2014-2020 är därför ett bra tillfälle att lägga fast 
en tillräcklig finansiell ram för AFSJ:s externa del.
Men ett antal faktorer kommer i fortsättningen att kunna hindra att den 
externa dimensionen av AFSJ förstärks. Att området är så pass omfattande 
och täcker såväl asyl och migration som civil- och straffrätt samt 
polissamarbete begränsar möjligheten att utveckla den externa delen av AFSJ 
till gemensam enhetlig politik. Omfattningen gör det också svårt att uppnå 
samma politiska kraftsamling som i andra mer etablerade och sammanhållna 
yttre politikområden i EU (utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik, handel och bistånd). 
Därmed försvåras också integrationen med andra yttre politikområden. 
Lissabonfördragets olika former för beslutsfattande och komplicerade 
institutionella struktur är en annan försvårande omständighet. Lägger man 
till det begränsningarna i EU:s ”delade kompetenser” är det uppenbart att 
det är medlemsländernas egna insatser på det här för medborgarna viktiga 
området som är avgörande – och att man kommer överens om ett gemensamt 
agerande. 
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